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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
ESSAYS ON THE EFFECT OF BOARD GENDER DIVERSITY ON FIRM RISK, 
PERFORMANCE, AND INSTITUTIONS’ OWNERSHIP PREFERENCES 
by 
Jodonnis Rodriguez 
Florida International University, 2016 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Edward R. Lawrence, Major Professor 
 This dissertation examines the effect of gender diversity on firm risk and financial 
performance, and on the stock ownership preferences of institutional investors. For the 
firm risk and financial performance analysis, we use U.S. firms listed on the S&P 500 
and NSE-listed Indian companies. The two samples provide our study with the ability to 
study gender diversity in a developed and emerging market with distinct economic 
frameworks, cultural traditions, and legal environments. 
 Our empirical tests show that firms with more gender diversity are less risky and 
have higher financial performance than firms with less gender influence. These results 
are consistent with the notion that the addition of female directors increases the collective 
intelligence of the board and, thus, leads to higher quality deliberations and decision-
making. The results are robust to propensity score matching which help control for 
endogeneity. Additionally, the results are robust to various measures of firm risk, 
financial performance, legal environments, industry and time fixed effects, and clustered 
standard errors.  
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 Furthermore, this dissertation examines the ownership preferences of institutional 
investors, a group of investors known for their ability to acquire private information and 
analyze publicly-disclosed information quickly. Researchers find that firms with female 
directors tend to disclose more firm-specific information and tend to serve on monitoring-
related committees. As higher disclosure and more monitoring decreases institutional 
investors’ incentive to collect and profit from private information, we hypothesize that 
they will invest less in gender diverse firms. For our empirical tests we use the data on 
US firms. We find that institutional investors tend to hold less shares in firms with more 
gender diversity. These results are robust to industry and time fixed effects, 
heteroscedasticity, and serial correlation.  
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CHAPTER 1: THE IMPACT OF BOARD GENDER DIVERSITY ON FIRMS’ RISK 
AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE  
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
 The recent financial crisis of 2007-2008 has raised concerns about firm risk. In this 
essay, we investigate if firms with gender diverse boards are better shielded from risk and 
downturns. The extant literature shows that females are less overconfident and more risk 
averse than males. In addition, female directors are tougher monitors, more likely to serve 
on audit-related committees, and have a positive impact on financial performance in firms 
with weak governance. Furthermore, studies show that the collective intelligence of an all-
male group increases with the addition of females (Woolley, Chabris, Pentland, Hashmi, 
and Malone, 2010). We explore the following three research questions: Does gender 
diversity affect firm risk? If so, how does diversity affect risk? Is the change in firm risk at 
the expense of financial performance?  
 In this essay, we investigate the differences in risk and financial performance 
between gender diverse firms and non-diverse firms.1 Much of the literature has focused 
on the stock market reaction around the announcement of the addition of female directors 
to boards (Adams, Gray, and Nowland, 2011) and the effect of diversity on financial 
performance (Carter, Simkins, and Simpson, 2003; Liu, Wei, and Xie, 2014). We study 
how the addition of female directors to the board affect the firm’s risk. We use the firms’ 
cash holdings and option implied volatility as proxies for the firm’s risk.  Cash holdings as 
a measure of risk is based on the work of Han and Qui (2007) and Bates, Kahle, and Stulz 
(2009), who provide theoretical and empirical support to the notion that firms with higher 
                                                     
1 From this point on, when we mention diversity we specifically refer to gender diversity.  
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cash holdings have higher cash flow volatility and income uncertainty. A firm’s option 
implied volatility is a forward-looking measure of risk that estimates the expected stock 
return volatility over the term of the option and is a more efficient predictor of future 
realized volatility than historical volatility.2 Next, we examine if changes in firm risk 
contribute to changes in firms’ financial performance. We analyze firms’ return on equity 
(ROE) over time to study the effect of board gender diversity on the long-term financial 
performance of the firm. Overall, our results suggest that firms with more gender diversity 
tend to be less risky and outperform firms with less diversity.  
 We use two measures of gender diversity: the percentage of female directors on the 
board and the Blau diversity index, which measures the diversity of an environment using 
the proportion of groups in that environment. We find that firms with more diversity have 
significantly lower levels of risk than firms with less diversity. More specifically, our 
univariate analysis indicates a 26.90% lower cash-to-assets ratio and a 15.28% lower 
expected volatility in gender diverse firms when compared to firms without board gender 
diversity. In our multivariate analysis, we compare firms with 20% female representation 
to firms with no diversity using the sample means of the independent variables in the 
estimated regression equation and compute the percentage difference in the estimates of 
cash holdings and expected volatility. We find that firms with 20% female representation 
on the board have a 19.01% lower cash-to-asset ratio and 9.35% less expected volatility 
than firms with no diversity. Similarly, our results indicate that firms with an equivalent 
                                                     
2 For an extensive review, see Poon and Granger (2003).  
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Blau index rating have a 19.12% lower cash-to-asset ratio and 10.65% less expected 
volatility than firms with no diversity.3  
Next, we examine whether the significant decrease in firms’ risk is at the expense 
of their financial performance. We find that firms with more diversity have significantly 
higher ROE than firms with less diverse boards. In a univariate setting, we find that the 
ROE in gender diverse firms is 12.72% higher than the return on equity for non-diverse 
firms. We find a larger increase in ROE in our multivariate specification, in which we 
estimate that boards with 20% female representation outperform firms with no diversity by 
22.11%. Similarly, firms with an equivalent Blau rating have a 28.30% higher ROE than 
firms with no board gender diversity. Our results for the firms’ risk and financial 
performance remains significant after controlling for industry and time fixed effects.  
 An important concern for our study is the issue of endogeneity. Reasonably, it may 
be that firms with more gender diversity are less risky and better performers to begin with 
or that female directors are more likely to work for less risky companies. To address 
endogeneity concerns we implement propensity score matching of gender diverse firms 
and non-diverse firms. Our robustness tests confirm that firms with more diversity are less 
risky and outperform less diverse firms. We then implement a difference-in-differences 
(DID) approach to measure the change in firm risk and financial performance between 
firms that add a female director (treatment group) and firms that do not add any female 
directors to their board (control group). We find a significant decrease in the expected 
                                                     
3 We use 20% female representation as it is a stated goal for 501(c)(3) organizations such as 2020 Women 
on Boards and is a close approximation to the average proportion of female directors in our sample. By 
equivalent Blau rating, we mean the Blau rating that corresponds to 20% female representation; 𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑢 =
1 − [0.202 + 0.802] = 0.32. 
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volatility for firms after the addition of the first and second female director to the board 
when compared to boards that did not add women to the board. Although our DID 
coefficient is not statistically significant for cash holdings and ROE, the direction of the 
results indicate that the addition of a second female director is beneficial for firms. Our 
DID tests provide preliminary evidence of critical mass theory which suggests that the 
addition of a second female director has a stronger effect on firm risk and financial 
performance as compared to the addition of the first female director.  
 Overall, our empirical results provide support to the idea that gender diversity is 
negatively related to firm risk and positively related to a firm’s financial performance. The 
changes in firms’ risk and performance may be driven by different underlying mechanisms. 
First, literature on gender differences in risk preferences suggests that women are more risk 
averse than men. Thus, the addition of female directors may increase the risk aversion of 
the board and result in less risk-taking by the firm.4 Second, the addition of female directors 
may improve the dynamics of the board and increase the collective intelligence, i.e. 
synergies, information sharing, and expertise of the group. An improvement in group 
dynamics may lead to longer and higher quality deliberations on a firm’s optimal strategies. 
As a result, firms may choose optimal projects that decrease firm risk and increase financial 
performance. Although gender differences in risk preferences or an improvement in group 
dynamics can lead to risk reduction, their effects on financial performance are not the same. 
Per the risk-return trade-off, risk averse investors should expect lower returns relative to 
investors who take more risk. On the other hand, an improvement in group dynamics can 
                                                     
4 However, there is evidence that women in finance behave differently from women in the general 
population and may be less risk averse than men. Since we examine non-financial firms, our results may be 
driven by gender differences in risk preferences. 
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lead to better informed decisions and deliberations, which may result in stronger financial 
performance. We find that the decrease in risk is not at the expense of financial 
performance, indicating board gender diversity may contribute to the improvements in the 
group dynamics of the board. 
 The implications of our study reveal the importance of gender diversity in the 
corporate leadership of firms. Our finding that gender diverse firms choose superior 
projects in the form of lower risk and better financial performance suggests that the 
addition of women to the board is beneficial for firms. Additionally, our paper suggests 
that the contributing cause of firms’ changes in risk and financial performance may be 
driven by an improvement in the group dynamics of the board rather than gender 
differences in risk preferences.  
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the literature, and 
Section 1.3 presents our hypotheses. Section 1.4 describes the data. Section 1.5 reviews the 
methodologies employed in the paper. Section 1.6 presents the results of our analyses. 
Section 1.7 concludes.  
1.2. Prior Literature 
 In this section, we review the extant literature that is most relevant to our research 
goals. In particular, we focus on studies that investigate the effect of diversity on firms’ 
financial performance. Next, we discuss empirical studies that have emphasized the 
relationship between diversity and firm risk. Lastly, we examine the existing literature on 
gender differences in risk preferences and group dynamics, which allows us to develop our 
research questions and emphasize our contributions to the literature.  
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 The evidence from the effect of gender diversity on firm value and performance is 
inconclusive with some researchers finding an increase in firm value and performance upon 
addition of female directors to the firm’s board whereas other researchers arrive at the 
opposite conclusion.  
Liu, Wei, and Xie (2014) examine the effect of board diversity on performance in 
Chinese firms. They find that diversity has a positive impact on return on sales and return 
on assets, and the impact is stronger with firms that have three or more women on the 
board. The authors provide evidence of critical mass theory in which the effect of 
marginalization may be reduced or eliminated by adding more than one female to the board. 
Other studies have shown a positive relationship between board diversity and return on 
assets as well as a positive relation with Tobin’s Q (Carter, Simkins, and Simpson, 2003; 
Erhardt, Werbel, and Shrader, 2003). Carter et al. (2003) argue that diversity, both gender 
and ethnic diversity, leads to greater board independence, which allows for a heterogeneous 
mix of ideas and creativity.  
 However, there is also evidence that gender diversity may not be beneficial to the 
financial performance of the firm. There is the possibility that the addition of one female 
to an all-male board may not have the desired effect on financial performance due to the 
fact that the female director may be marginalized if she expresses a different point of view. 
Some studies show that more diversity does not improve a firm’s financial performance 
after controlling for reverse causality (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Carter et al., 2010). 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) suggest that mandating board gender diversity may reduce firm 
value for well-governed firms. Ahern and Dittmar (2012) study the impact of Norway’s 
mandated board gender diversity on firm value. The authors conclude that the mandate led 
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to a significant drop in Tobin’s Q in the few years following the announcement of the law. 
Similarly, Matsa and Miller (2013) show that Norwegian firms affected by the mandate 
experienced fewer reductions in the workforce and increasing labor costs that eventually 
led to a reduction in profits.  
 The extant literature on diversity and firm risk is sparse. Adams and Ferreira (2004) 
and Hillman, Shropshire, and Cannella (2007) find that firms with higher stock return 
variability have a lower probability of female presence on the board. Adams and Ferreira 
(2004) use the standard deviation of monthly stock returns for the five years prior to the 
observation, whereas Hillman, Shropshire, and Cannella (2007) use the firm’s standard 
deviation of daily stock returns for the fiscal year.  However, in these studies risk is a proxy 
for the complexity of the firm. Their results suggest that firms are less likely to have female 
directors if the firm is too complex, especially in compensation structure.  
 Adams and Ragunathan (2015) study gender diverse banks around the financial 
crisis of 2007-2009. The authors use weekly stock return volatility, idiosyncratic risk, tail 
risk, and Z-score as their main measures of risk. The authors report that banks with female 
directors did not take less risk during the crisis and performed better relative to non-diverse 
banks. Berger, Kick, and Schaek (2014) examine the effect of age, gender, and education 
of executive directors on bank risk-taking. The authors conclude that younger executive 
teams and a higher proportion of female executives increase bank risk while an increase in 
executives with Ph.D. degrees decreases risk. 
The impact of gender diversity on firms may be related to gender differences in risk 
preferences. There is extensive research in finance that shows significant behavioral 
disparity between men and women. Prior literature has shown that women tend to be more 
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risk averse than men (Jianakopolos and Bernasek, 1998; Sunden and Surette, 1998; Agnew, 
Balduzzi, and Sunden, 2003; Watson and McNaughton, 2007; Croson and Gneezy, 2009; 
Charness and Gneezy, 2012). In addition, research has shown that women tend to be less 
overconfident and more conservative than men (Lundeberg, Fox, and Puncochar, 1994; 
Beyer and Bowden, 1997; Barber and Odean, 2000). Huang and Kisgen (2014) investigate 
whether firms with female CEOs and CFOs make different financing or acquisition 
decisions compared to firms with male executives. The authors find that firms with female 
executives grow more slowly and are less likely to make acquisitions. In addition, 
acquisitions made by female executives have higher announcement returns than 
acquisitions made by male executives. The authors suggest their results are due to relative 
overconfidence by men in corporate decision-making. Similarly, Levi, Li, and Zhang 
(2014) examine the influence of director gender in a mergers and acquisitions setting. The 
authors conclude that less overconfident female directors are less likely to overestimate the 
gains from a merger or acquisition than their male counterparts. Firms with more female 
directors are less likely to initiate a merger or acquisition because they may value the target 
firm less, due to estimating lower values of future cash flows or discounting the future cash 
flows at a higher discount rate, than their male counterparts as a result of less 
overconfidence.  
However, there is some evidence that gender differences in risk aversion are 
mitigated when controlling for education levels and/or financial expertise (Hibbert, 
Lawrence, and Prakash, 2013). Similarly, Hardies, Breesch, and Branson (2013) report that 
self-selection and socialization can eliminate the gender difference in overconfidence. 
Adams and Funk (2012) use a survey of directors and provide evidence that male and 
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female directors differ in their risk attitudes but in ways that vary from gender differences 
in the general population. The authors conclude that female directors are more risk-loving 
than male directors, and thus, board gender diversity may not lead to more risk averse 
decision making. Additionally, Adams and Ragunathan (2015) examine financial firms and 
find that banks with female directors did not take less risks around the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis and had better performances (as measured by Tobin’s Q, ROA, and the fraction on 
non-performing loans) than other banks. The authors attribute their results to self-selection. 
They report that women who choose to have careers in finance tend to be less risk averse 
than women in the general population and gender differences in risk aversion “almost 
disappear for men and women in finance.” 
 Gender diversity may affect firms through a different mechanism. A diverse board 
may help to introduce new ideas and perspectives that a non-diverse board may lack. 
Diversity of perspective can have a positive effect on a homogenous group. Prior literature 
indicates that diverse groups take longer to reach decisions, have higher quality 
deliberations, and have more effective communication than groups lacking diversity 
(Stephenson, 2004; Huse and Solberg, 2006). Furthermore, Woolley, Chabris, Pentland, 
Hashmi, and Malone (2010) provide evidence of a group intelligence factor. The authors 
report that the addition of females to a group increases the collective intelligence of the 
group along with the social sensitivity of individual members and the variance of the 
number of speaking turns. Given that boards with gender diversity make higher quality 
decisions and communicate more effectively, improvements in the dynamics of the group 
may have positive effects on firm risk and financial performance.   
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1.3. Hypothesis Development  
 The addition of female directors to the board may alter the collective risk aversion 
of the group due to gender differences in risk preferences. The decision-making process of 
a board may be sensitive to the changes in risk preferences after the addition of female 
board members and, thus, may alter the decisions of the firm. For example, a board with 
female directors may have a lower acceptance rate of risky projects than boards without 
female directors. If women are more risk averse and less overconfident than men, then they 
may evaluate risky projects using higher discount rates or with lower expected future cash 
flows. In addition, women may perceive the risky projects to have a lower probability of 
success than men.  
 Increasing diversity may lead to an improvement in the dynamics of the board and 
helps to introduce new ideas and perspectives that a non-diverse board lacks. Given that 
boards with diversity make higher quality decisions and communicate more effectively, 
improvements in the dynamics of the group may alter the risk profile of firms with more 
gender diversity. Furthermore, if market participants are aware of the gender differences 
in risk preferences or are aware of improving dynamics in the corporate leadership, then 
perhaps they may perceive firms with more diversity to be less risky. For example, market 
participants may acknowledge that firms with higher quality boards are more likely to 
reject risky projects that could be detrimental to firm value. As a result, if a firm is less 
likely to accept risky projects that could decrease firm value, then their risk is more likely 
to decrease. Thus, we expect lower risk for gender diverse firms as compared to firms 
without female directors.  
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We formally state our first hypothesis as: 
First Hypothesis: A firm’s risk will be lower for firms with board gender diversity.  
𝐻𝑜: 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖
1 − 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖
0 ≥ 0 
𝐻𝐴: 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖
1 − 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖
0 < 0 
where the superscript of 1 denotes firms with female directors and 0 denotes firms without 
female directors.     
Per the risk-return trade-off theory, firms that take lower risks should expect lower 
returns. Thus, if gender differences in risk preferences are the cause of changes in firm risk, 
then the addition of female directors will also cause a decrease in financial performance. 
For instance, imagine a firm that takes on no risky projects and invests all of its free cash 
flow in assets earning the risk-free rate. Such a firm has eliminated its risk at the expense 
of the possibility of earning a higher rate of return on its free cash flow.  
On the other hand, per the literature on group dynamics, the addition of female 
directors leads to increases in collective intelligence, the quality of deliberations, and the 
amount of time dedicated to developing optimal strategies. As a result, project selection in 
gender diverse firms may be superior relative to non-diverse firms with respect to firm risk 
and financial performance. If improving group dynamics is the cause of a decrease in firm 
risk, then we posit that such firms will also have higher rates of return. In this case, firms 
take on a more optimal and acceptable level of risk, which will lead to higher rates of 
return. Thus, the higher acceptance rate of optimal projects will contribute to better 
financial performance.  
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We formally state our second hypothesis as: 
Second Hypothesis: Financial performance will be higher for firms with board gender 
diversity.  
𝐻𝑜: 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖
1 − 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖
0 ≤ 0 
𝐻𝐴: 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖
1 − 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖
0 > 0 
1.4. Data and Sample Overview 
 
 We use annual data on S&P 500 companies to examine our hypotheses. We collect 
available data on the composition of firms’ board of directors from the GMI Ratings library 
in Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). More specifically, GMI Ratings provides 
corporate governance data, including the number of women serving on the board of 
directors, the total number of directors, and the number of independent directors for S&P 
500 companies. The GMI Ratings data is increasingly available from 2001-2013 for many 
S&P 500 companies. In addition, we collect our firm-level control variables from the 
Compustat annual file and stock return data from CRSP. The intersection of data from 
Compustat, CRSP, and GMI ratings gives us an unbalanced panel of 419 firms and 3,617 
firm-year observations. The exclusion of finance/insurance companies (NAICS 52), utility 
companies (NAICS 22) and missing data further reduce our available sample size in each 
of the analyses. Similar to Bates et al. (2009), we winsorize the explanatory variables for 
large outliers. Research and development expenses (R&D) and capital expenditures 
(Capex) are winsorized at the 1% level on both tails. In addition, free cash flow (CashFlow) 
is winsorized at the bottom 1% tail while market-to-book (MB) is winsorized at the top 1% 
tail. Finally, leverage (Lev) is restricted to be between 0 and 1. Appendix A contains a 
more detailed description of the variables in our study.  
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1.5. Methodology 
 We employ two measures of diversity for our model specifications. First, we use 
the fraction of female directors on the board, which is computed as the number of female 
directors divided by the total number of directors. This linear measure of diversity fails to 
parsimoniously capture the effect of diversity as the proportion of female directors on the 
board increases.5 Hence, to capture diversity, we construct the Blau (1977) diversity index 
for each firm in each year.  
𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑢 = 1 −  ∑ 𝑃𝑖
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
The Blau diversity index measures the diversity of a system using the proportion, Pi, of 
groups in a given system. For example, in a system with two groups (n=2; male and 
female), a perfectly diverse board (50%-50% composition) would have a maximum Blau 
index rating of 0.50, and a board with no diversity would have a minimum Blau rating of 
0. In addition, a board with 30% females has the same Blau rating as a board with 30% 
males.  
 One approach to measure a firm’s forward looking risk is by examining the extent 
of their cash holdings as a proxy of cash flow volatility. Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and 
Williamson (1999) show that firms with higher industry cash flow volatility hold more in 
liquid assets. Han and Qui (2007) and Riddick and Whited (2009) provide further support 
to the notion that more income uncertainty and higher income variability lead firms to hold 
                                                     
5 Perfem, which represents the percent of female directors on a firm’s board, incorrectly interprets an all-
female board as perfectly diverse, which is not the case because an all-female board is the other extreme 
example of a homogenous board. See Appendix B for more information on the analytical and graphical 
analysis of the two diversity measures.  
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more cash. Bates et al. (2009) find that cash levels, on average, have more than doubled 
from 1980 to 2006 and point out that firms have sufficient cash to retire all of their debt. 
The authors conclude that the cash increase is related to a precautionary demand for cash, 
is not driven by agency conflicts, and is a result of a firm’s cash flow becoming riskier. In 
this setting, we interpret cash holdings as a measure of risk because it is dependent on 
management’s outlook of the firm. For example, we posit that if management expects 
volatile future earnings, then it will decide to keep more cash on hand to smooth out 
earnings volatility.  If the addition of women to the board results in the reduction of the 
firm’s risk, then we should observe lower cash holdings for gender diverse firms as 
compared to firms without female directors.   
 Option implied volatility is another forward-looking risk measure of firm risk that 
market participants believe will be over the term of the option.6 A firm’s expected 
volatility, when measured as implied volatility, indicates market participants’ beliefs about 
future risk. Implied volatility is the firm’s risk that parties involved believe will be 
determined by changes in the firm’s option prices.  
 Several studies have shown that implied volatility is a good and more efficient 
predictor of future realized volatility as compared to historical volatility (Fleming, Ostdiek, 
and Whaley, 1995; Fleming, 1998; Christensen and Prabhala, 1998; Blair, Poon, and 
                                                     
6 Compustat provides a measure of implied volatility computed from stock options granted to directors and 
executives during the firm’s fiscal year. Implied volatility is computed using the market price of the traded 
options on the day it is granted to the directors and executives using either a lattice model or the Black-
Scholes closed-form model. The term of the option is at least as large as the vesting period of the stock 
options. This is different from Execucomp’s measure of expected volatility, which uses the standard deviation 
of monthly returns from the previous five years.  
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Taylor, 2001; Ederington and Guan, 2002; Szakmary, Ors, Kim, and Davidson III, 2003). 
For an extensive review on the subject, see Poon and Granger (2003).  
 For additional robustness, we compare several measures for firm risk for gender 
diverse and non-diverse firms. These measures include beta, total risk, idiosyncratic 
volatility, downside risk, and future risk. Wang (2012) provides two measures of future 
risk by computing the standard deviation of monthly returns over the next 12 months 
(SD12) and the standard deviation of monthly returns over the next 24 months (SD24). For 
example, for fiscal year 2001, we compute SD12 as the standard deviation of monthly 
returns in 2002 for each firm. Similarly, we compute SD24 as the standard deviation of 
monthly returns in 2002 and 2003 for each firm. We compute this for each fiscal year in 
the sample.7  
 The total risk of a stock’s return consists of systematic risk and idiosyncratic 
volatility. To compute these measures of risk, we implement yearly rolling regressions of 
firms’ excess stock returns on the excess return on the market over the previous five years 
as shown below: 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (1)  
where 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the monthly excess stock return for firm i at time t and 𝑟𝑚,𝑡 is the monthly 
excess return of the market portfolio.8 We estimate Equation (1) using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) to estimate each firm’s beta and the variance of the residuals. We denote 
                                                     
7 We cannot compute SD24 for fiscal year 2013 (as of December 2015) because monthly returns for fiscal 
year 2015 are not yet available on CRSP.   
 
8 We also have computed the same regression model using excess daily returns. The results are similar and 
available upon request.  
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the variance of the residuals as 𝜎𝜀,𝑡
2 , the variance of the excess market return as 𝜎𝑚,𝑡 
2 and 
the total risk of the firm 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2  is the sum of the two former variances:  
𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2 = 𝛽𝑖
2𝜎𝑚,𝑡
2 + 𝜎𝑒,𝑡
2  (2)  
We compute this historical measure risk for the two groups of firms, those that have at least 
one female director and others with no female directors. We use data from the past 60 
months to compute the measures of risk; for example, for fiscal year 2006, we regress 
monthly excess stock returns on monthly excess market returns for each firm using returns 
from 2001 through 2005. The risk measures are computed for firms that had at least one 
female director on the board from 2001 through 2005 and for firms that had no female 
directors throughout the same period. We repeat this procedure for each year in the sample. 
Since the board composition data begins in 2001, we cannot compute the historical 
measures of risk because we are unable to determine board gender representation prior to 
2001 and, thus, unable to satisfy our requirement. As a result, the historical risk measures 
are calculated from 2006 through 2013.  
 Downside risk measures firms’ risk of negative returns. We compute firms’ 
downside risk using the semi-standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the previous 
five years. We assign a return of zero as the target rate. Thus, downside risk is measuring 
the standard deviation of negative monthly returns over the previous five years.   
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = [E[(𝑋𝑖)]
2I{𝑋𝑖<0}]
1
2 
where I{𝑋𝑖<0} is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the return for firm i is negative and 0 
otherwise. 
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 We perform a univariate analysis for the risk and return measures for the two 
groups: firms with and firms without female directors.  We compare the difference in the 
mean cash holdings and expected volatility between both groups. Then, we perform 
regression analysis in which we include a measure of board diversity while controlling for 
the factors that may explain cash holdings and expected volatility. We run the following 
regression using our measures of firm risk, cash to total assets (LIQ) and option implied 
volatility (OptVol).   
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 =  β1𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + β2−10𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (3) 
 The variable of interest, Diversity, is one of the measures of board gender diversity: 
the proportion of female directors on the board or the Blau diversity index. We run the 
regression in equation 3 for both measures of diversity. Using Bates at al. (2009), we 
control for MB, firm size (Size), CashFlow, Capex, Lev, and R&D. In addition, we include 
two governance controls that are related to firm risk: the size of the board of directors 
(BoardSize) and the proportion of outside directors (OutDirectors). MB is a proxy for 
investment opportunities. If a firm has a high MB ratio, then it typically has a strong 
investment opportunity set. Firms with higher MB values tend to have higher return 
prospects in the future. Thus, we expect firms with higher market-to-book values to be less 
risky. Size is the logarithm of the book value of total assets. Larger firms tend to be less 
risky. Firms with higher levels of CashFlow can generate revenue faster and, hence, are 
less risky.  
 Capex is used to purchase productive assets that can be used as collateral or lead to 
increases in productivity. As such, the latter could increase a firm’s ability to borrow debt 
and, thus, reduce its demand for cash. A firm with weak growth prospects will invest less 
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in capital expenditures. Thus, we expect firms that invest more in capital expenditures are 
less risky. Lev is total debt to total assets. If the firm has a high level of debt, then we 
expected the firm to use its cash to retire some of its debt obligations, which leads to a 
negative relationship between LIQ and Lev. On the other hand, less risky firms have the 
ability to shift their capital structure towards debt. Thus, we have no ex-ante expectations 
for the relationship between risk and leverage. Similar to MB, R&D can serve as a proxy 
for future investment opportunities, and, hence we expect firms that invest more in research 
and development to be less risky. We control for industry fixed effects, 𝛾𝑖, and time fixed 
effects, 𝜆𝑡, to control for differences in unobservable variables across industries and time. 
 Similar to our analyses for firm risk, we perform a univariate analysis comparing 
the mean difference in financial performance between diverse and non-diverse firms. Next, 
we study the relationship between return on equity and diversity with the following 
regression specification.  
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽1 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2−7 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖             (4) 
The control variables are accounting ratios that help explain return on equity. Boyd, 
Boland, Dhuyvetter, and Barton (2007) study the determinants of ROE and find that 
liquidity, leverage, profitability, and efficiency variables help explain ROE. A high current 
ratio, a measure of a firm’s investment in short-term assets, indicates a firm has sufficient 
liquidity. However, overinvestment in short-term assets may harm financial performance. 
Hence, we have no ex-ante expectations between current ratio and financial performance. 
Moreover, higher levels of debt may hinder financial performance if too much revenue is 
used to service the firm’s debt. However, if a firm uses to debt to finance its productive 
assets, then increased debt may benefit the firm. 
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As a result, we have no ex-ante expectations on the relationship between leverage and 
financial performance. Furthermore, a higher net profit margin is positively related to 
higher net income, so we expect a positive relationship between net profit margin and 
financial performance. A higher asset turnover indicates a firm is producing more revenue 
from each dollar of sales that it generates. Thus, we expect more efficient firms to have 
higher financial performance. We also control for economies of scale by using the firm size 
and expect larger firms to have stronger financial performance.  
 To help address selection bias and endogeneity, we employ a propensity-score 
matched sample framework. Similar to Levi et al. (2014), we generate our probability 
scores through a yearly logit regression. Our dependent variable is a binary variable 
indicating the presence of female directors on the board, and the explanatory variables are 
firm size, return on assets, and leverage. We match the firms with female directors to firms 
without female directors based on the smallest difference in propensity scores.  
 Lastly, we employ a difference-in-differences (DID) regression approach in two 
different scenarios. In one analysis, the treatment group consists of sample firms that added 
their first female director, and the control group consists of firms that did not add any 
female directors. In the second analysis, the treatment group consists of sample firms that 
added a second woman to the board9, and the control group consists of firms that did not 
add any female directors during the sample period. We compute the difference between 
firms’ cash holdings, expected volatility, and ROE at time T-1 and T+1, where T is the 
year in which the second female director was added to the board. We run a balanced 
                                                     
9 We require the treatment group to have one female director at time T-1, add a second female director at 
time T, and remain with two female directors at time T+1. We require the control group to remain without 
female directors from time T-1 to T+1. Appendix B highlights the DID regression model.  
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regression by matching on sector and on the minimum difference in firm size as measured 
by total assets. We examine the incremental effect of adding a first and second woman for 
the following reasons. First, prior evidence suggests that adding a single female may not 
have much of an effect due to potential marginalization. Second, most of the firms in our 
sample have at least one woman on the board, and we improve the statistical power of our 
analysis by studying this larger sample of additions.  
1.6. Empirical Results 
 
 We report summary statistics in Tables 1.1 and 1.2. Table 1.1 indicates that gender 
diversity on the boards of U.S. firms has been steadily increasing since 2001. The average 
percent of female directors on a board has risen from 11.63% in 2001 to 17.54% in 2013. 
Given that board gender diversity is not mandated in the United States, the numbers 
indicate that firms may have been seeking to improve the functionality of boards. This may 
be a result of stronger demand for improved corporate governance after several major 
accounting scandals or due to diversity interest groups pushing firms to add more women 
to their boards.  In Table 1.2, we provide another perspective on the increasing diversity 
trends in our sample. The proportion of sample firms with no diversity has decreased from 
a high of 18.57% in 2002 to a low of 7.62% in 2013. Additionally, the proportion of firms 
with more than one female director has increased from a low of 31.65% in 2001 to a high 
of 62.58% in 2013. In Table 1.3, we provide summary statistics for all of the variables in 
our study. The cash to total assets ratio, LIQ, and option volatility are higher for firms 
without women on the board. Additionally, we notice that gender diverse firms and non-
diverse firms are similar in size, Lev, CashFlow, Capex, R&D expenses, and profitability. 
In Table 1.4 we provide the univariate statistics of firms conditional on the presence of 
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female directors. Our univariate analysis indicates a significant difference in risk and 
financial performance between firms with and without female directors. Firms with gender 
diverse boards have 26.90% less cash holdings, 15.28% lower expected volatility, and 
11.29% higher ROE.  
 In Table 1.5 we report the regression results for equation (1). We use GMM to 
estimate Newey-West test-statistics to control for possible heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation in the model. We find the coefficient on Perfem to be negative and statistically 
significant at less than 1% level with a p-value of 0.0001. The results are robust to our 
second measure of diversity, the Blau diversity index, with a p-value of 0.0155. 
Additionally, our results remain significant when we control for industry and time fixed 
effects. Our results show that boards with more gender diversity hold significantly less 
cash after controlling for factors that may influence cash holdings. Furthermore, to the 
extent that firms with higher cash holdings are more risky, we conclude that firms with 
more diversity are less risky than firms with less diversity. These results are consistent with 
our first hypothesis. In a multivariate setting, on average, a firm with a 20% female 
representation on the board results in a 19.01% to 19.12% decrease in cash holdings 
compared to non-diverse firms, depending on the measure of diversity.10  Given that gender 
quotas are high in some parts of the world, the potential for an improvement in the risk 
profile of a given firm may be higher to the extent that mandated quotas do not confound 
the risk reduction potential.  
                                                     
10 A 20% to 80% female-to-male board composition results in a Blau index rating of 0.32. The decrease in 
cash holdings was computed using the estimated coefficients from Table 3 and inputting the average sample 
values of each of the independent variables into the estimated regression model. We use 20% female 
representation because this is a  
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 In addition, firms with more diversity may keep lower levels of cash because of a 
higher rate of rejection of risky projects. If less risky projects are accepted (either due to 
gender differences in risk preferences or improvements in group dynamics), then the need 
to keep cash on hand to fund future investment opportunities may be less important for 
firms with diversity. Furthermore, firms with more diversity may spend more on programs 
that do not explicitly add value to the firm. Instead, firms with more gender diversity may 
add implicit value by creating and investing in programs that improve employee 
productivity and morale.  Matsa and Miller (2013) show that Norwegian firms affected by 
the board gender quota have higher labor costs and lower workforce reductions. Thus, it 
may be that firms with more gender diversity choose to spend more of their cash holdings 
on workforce stability and morale-boosting programs.  
 In Table 1.6 we report the expected volatility regression results robust to 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Our results indicate a negative and significant 
relationship between gender diversity and a firm’s expected volatility. We obtain similar 
results with the Blau index as a diversity measure. The regression results indicate that a 
firm with 20% female representation, on average, has 9.35% to 10.65% less expected 
volatility than a firm with no female directors.11 Table 1.6 also shows a consistent negative 
relationship between expected volatility and market-to-book, firm size, board size, and the 
proportion of independent directors. The p-values for these four control variables are 
significant at the 1% level (p-value < 0.0001). Firms with better investment possibilities 
and larger firms tend to be associated with lower levels of risk. Furthermore, the model 
                                                     
11 A few interest groups, such as 2020 Women on Boards, has a stated goal of 20% female directors by 
2020 (www.2020wob.com). 
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indicates a negative and significant relationship between a firm’s financial performance 
and expected volatility. These results are consistent with prior arguments that firms with 
stronger earnings performance are more stable and perceived as less risky. Interestingly, 
the relationship between financial leverage and expected volatility is not significant. This 
may be a result of confounding factors. That is to say, firms with higher leverage may have 
a higher probability of default; however, firms with higher leverage also may have more 
financial stability, which can explain why they have access to more debt.  
 These results provide a different perspective on gender diversity and a firm’s risk 
characteristics. The expected volatility levels in firms are related to the market participants’ 
perceptions of a firm’s risk. Thus, our results provide evidence that perhaps market 
participants acknowledge some improvement in the risk profile of the firm with increasing 
diversity. In addition, perhaps there exists a perception of improved corporate governance 
with increasing diversity. Firms with better governance may be perceived as less risky than 
firms with poor governance policies and infrastructure. More importantly, the results are 
also economically significant because they indicate that more gender diversity has a large, 
downward effect on firm risk. 
 In Table 1.7, we report the results of the relationship between diversity and firm 
financial performance, controlling for liquidity, profitability, leverage, and efficiency. We 
report that firms with more diversity tend to outperform firms with less diversity. The 
results are robust to both diversity measures with p-values less than 0.0001. Additionally, 
we find that firms with more money tied in short-term assets underperformed. This is 
consistent with the notion that long-term assets are the productive assets used to generate 
cash flows streams and that short-term assets do not generate large enough returns to justify 
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large holdings in such assets. We also show that financial performance is positively related 
to leverage, profitability, and efficiency. Our regression model estimates that boards with 
20% female representation outperform firms with no diversity by approximately 22.11% 
to 28.30%.  
 To address potential selection bias and endogeneity concerns, we use a propensity 
score matched sample controlling for firm size, ROA, leverage, and cash holdings.  The 
results in Table 1.8 indicate that firms with more diversity have significantly less cash 
holdings and lower expected volatility. Furthermore, the coefficients on gender diversity 
are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The results indicate that more 
gender diversity results in lower levels of firm risk after controlling for key firm 
characteristics. In Table 1.9, we report our propensity score matched sample estimates for 
financial performance. Our results report a consistently positive and significant 
relationship between the proportion of female directors and ROE.  
 In Table 1.10, we report the results from our DID analysis. We provide support that 
the addition of female directors to the board leads to a decrease in cash holdings of 1.31%. 
The change in cash holdings for the treatment group is -0.33%, and the change in cash 
holdings for the control group is 0.99%. Similarly, the expected volatility of firms that 
added a second woman to the board increased by 16.03% less than firms that did not add 
women to the board. This result is significant at the 1% level (p = 0.0034). More 
specifically, the expected volatility of firms that added a second female director increased 
by 5.05% while it increased by 21.07% for firms that did not add any women to the board. 
Lastly, our results indicate that firms that added a second woman to the board outperformed 
firms that did not add women to the board by 1.65%. Although the significance of our DID 
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coefficient is not statistically significant in the case of cash holdings and ROE, we believe 
the direction of the results indicate that the addition of females to the board is beneficial 
for firms. In Table 1.11, we report the changes in firm risk and financial performance after 
the addition of the first woman to the board. We find that cash holdings for firms with their 
first female addition increased 1.08 percentage points higher relative to non-diverse firms. 
OptVol was 17.42% lower for firms that added their first female director. In addition, ROE 
is about 0.41% higher for gender diverse firms as compared to non-diverse firms. The 
addition of a second female director appears to have a stronger effect on firm risk and 
financial performance than the addition of the first female director.  
 Moreover, in Table 1.12 we report the correlation between our measures of risk. 
Consistent with prior theoretical and empirical studies, we find cash holdings as a 
percentage of total assets to be positively correlated with OptVol and various measures of 
equity risk. The results indicate that cash holdings have a correlation of less than 0.30 while 
OptVol has at least a correlation of 0.56 with the other measures of risk in the study. Given 
its relatively low correlation, cash holdings as a measure of risk provides a different 
perspective on firm risk. For further robustness, we use traditional measures of equity risk 
as alternatives to cash holdings and option implied volatility. In Table 1.13 we report the 
findings for beta, idiosyncratic volatility, downside risk, future 1-year stock return 
volatility, and future 2-year stock return volatility. Our findings using these alternative 
measures of risk are consistent with our findings using cash holdings and OptVol. The 
coefficient on our diversity measure is negative and significant at the 1% level for the 
historical measures of equity risk and negative and significant at the 5% level for forward-
looking measures of equity risk.  
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1.7. Conclusion  
 In this essay, we use directorship data on nonfinancial S&P 500 firms to study the 
effect of gender diversity on firms’ risk and financial performance. We report that board 
gender diversity is associated with less firm risk. Additionally, our results suggest that the 
decrease in firm risk is not at the expense of financial performance. We use firms’ cash 
holdings and option implied volatility as measures of risk and ROE as a measure of firm 
performance. Specifically, we find that firms with gender diverse boards have roughly 19% 
less risk and at least 22% higher ROE than non-diverse firms. Our results are robust to 
several endogeneity tests and various measures of risk. Our DID tests indicate that the 
addition of a female director leads to a statistically and economically significant decrease 
in a firm’s option volatility. The results may be driven by the impact of the addition of 
female directors due to either gender differences in risk preferences or an improvement in 
the collective intelligence of the board. Both theories would lead to a decrease in firm risk; 
however, their impact on financial performance would differ from one another. We 
attribute our results to an improvement in the group dynamics of the board rather than 
gender differences in risk preferences.  
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Table 1.1. Board Gender Diversity of S&P 500 Firms  
This table reports the measures of board gender diversity over time. Perfem is the average percent of 
female directors on the board of S&P 500 companies. Blau reports the average Blau index rating of S&P 
500 firms for each year in the sample. The Blau rating ranges from 0 (no diversity) to 0.50 (maximum  
diversity).  
 
YEAR Perfem Blau 
2001 11.63% 0.1922 
2002 11.81% 0.1933 
2003 12.81% 0.2067 
2004 13.54% 0.2189 
2005 13.71% 0.2224 
2006 14.46% 0.2325 
2007 14.46% 0.2323 
2008 14.77% 0.2363 
2009 14.79% 0.2360 
2010 15.59% 0.2469 
2011 15.69% 0.2482 
2012 16.42% 0.2569 
2013 17.54% 0.2720 
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Table 1.2. Proportion of S&P 500 Firms Grouped By Number of Female Directors  
This table reports proportion of sample firms with 0, 1, and more than 1 female director on the board for 
each year in the sample. The columns 0,1, and >1 report the proportion of S&P 500 firms with 0, 1, and 
more than 1 female director on the board. Total is the sum of the row total.  
 
# Female Directors 
YEAR 0 1 >1 Total 
2001 16.51% 51.83% 31.65% 100.00% 
2002 18.57% 47.26% 34.18% 100.00% 
2003 18.52% 41.98% 39.51% 100.00% 
2004 14.12% 43.53% 42.35% 100.00% 
2005 13.31% 42.34% 44.35% 100.00% 
2006 10.45% 42.91% 46.64% 100.00% 
2007 11.69% 39.11% 49.19% 100.00% 
2008 11.96% 35.51% 52.54% 100.00% 
2009 13.13% 35.94% 50.94% 100.00% 
2010 18.27% 30.65% 51.08% 100.00% 
2011 11.25% 33.43% 55.32% 100.00% 
2012 10.90% 28.97% 60.12% 100.00% 
2013 7.62% 29.80% 62.58% 100.00% 
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Table 1.3. Summary Statistics, 2001-2013  
The descriptive statistics of the sample are presented in two groups: firms with no gender diversity (Female = 0) 
and firms with gender diversity (Female = 1). N is the number of firm-year observations. Mean is the average for 
the firm-year observations. Std Dev is the standard deviation of the variable. Min and Max report the minimum and 
maximum values, respectively of the variable. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A 
 
 
 Female = 0 
 
Female =1 
 N Mean St Dev Min Max 
 
N Mean St Dev Min Max 
Dependent Variables      
 
     
LIQ 394 0.18 0.18 0 0.86 
 
2,619 0.13 0.14 0 0.80 
OptVol 266 0.39 0.11 0.18 0.96 
 
1,857 0.33 0.11 0.11 0.97 
ROE 405 0.08 0.06 -0.04 0.21 
 
2,647 0.09 0.062 -0.04 0.21 
Independent Variables      
 
     
MB 405 1.93 1.32 0.30 7.50 
 
2,675 1.76 1.25 0.28 13.05 
Size 480 8.70 0.92 6.23 11.06 
 
3,135 9.30 1.18 6.23 13.59 
CASHFLOW 393 0.10 0.07 -0.29 0.30 
 
2,751 0.10 0.06 -0.34 0.45 
Lev 471 0.20 0.16 0 0.99 
 
3,109 0.22 0.15 0 1 
R&D 287 0.06 0.06 0 0.33 
 
2,267 0.04 0.05 0 0.68 
Capex 480 0.06 0.07 0 0.46 
 
3,098 0.05 0.04 0 0.35 
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Table 1.3 (continued).  
 
 Female = 0  Female =1 
 N Mean St Dev Min Max  N Mean St Dev Min Max 
ROA 480 0.05 0.11 -1.01 0.37 
 
3,113 0.07 0.08 -0.66 0.50 
CurrentRatio 310 349.52 647.68 2.28 1894.36  2,514 165.05 422.61 2.28 1894.36 
EqMulti 405 1.18 0.23 0.98 1.83  2,664 1.25 0.23 0.98 1.83 
NetProfit 316 0.15 0.12 -0.04 0.37  2,237 0.13 0.10 -0.04 0.37 
AssetTO 349 0.72 0.44 0.29 2.45  2,377 0.97 0.58 0.29 2.45 
TIE 417 14.49 21.86 -1.20 76.07  2,874 13.11 18.20 -1.20 76.07 
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Table 1.4. Univariate Analysis of Risk and Performance Measures 
The univariate statistics of the sample are presented in two groups: firms with no gender diversity (Female 
= 0) and firms with gender diversity (Female = 1). N is the number of firm-year observations. Mean is the 
average of the variables. Std Dev is the standard deviation of the variables. Variable definitions are 
provided in Appendix A.  
 
 
 
  Female = 0  Female = 1 Difference in Means 
Var N Mean Std Dev N Mean Std Dev Diff P-value 
               
LIQ 394 0.1762 0.1835 2619 0.1288 0.1345 -0.0474a <0.0001 
               
OptVol  266 0.3913 0.1110 1857 0.3315 10.9453 -0.0598 a <0.0001 
               
ROE 405 0.0770 0.0635 2647 0.0868 0.0620 0.0098 a 0.0033 
Note: a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 1.5. Determinants of Firms’ Cash Holdings  
The first two columns report the results of the cash holdings (LIQ) model using the fraction  
of female directors (Perfem) and the Blau diversity index. We report the Newey-West t-stat associated  
p-values. The results of the first two columns includes an intercept term. The last two columns report the 
same model but controlling for industry and year fixed effects. These regressions do not include an 
intercept term.  
 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽1 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2−9 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
      
  LIQ 
Intercept  0.38 a 0.38 a   
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001)   
Perfem  -0.11 a --- -0.16 a --- 
  (0.01)  (<0.0001)  
Blau  --- -0.09 b --- -0.10 a 
   (0.0155)  (<0.0001) 
MB  0.03 a 0.03 a 0.04 a 0.04 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Size  0.003  0.003  0.001a 0.002 
  (0.3592) (0.3465) (0.6788) (0.4773) 
CASHFLOW  0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.07 
  (0.8413) (0.8012) (0.4186) (0.3099) 
Lev  -0.14 a -0.14 a  -0.12 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
R&D  0.99 a 0.99 a  0.99 a 0.94 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Capex  -0.86 a -0.86 a -0.67 a -0.61 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
BoardSize  -0.11a -0.11 a -0.11 a -0.10 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
OutDirectors  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02 
  (0.3170) (0.341) (0.3788) (0.3952) 
      
Industry F.E.   No No Yes Yes 
Year F.E   No No Yes Yes 
      
Adj. R2  45.06% 45.12% 49.10% 51.77% 
N   1,901 1,901 1,901 1,901 
Note: a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 1.6. Determinants of Firms’ Expected Volatility  
The first two columns report the results of the expected volatility (OptVol) model using the fraction  
of female directors (Perfem) and the Blau diversity index. We report the Newey-West t-stat associated  
p-values. The last two columns report the results controlling for industry and year fixed effects.  
 
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽1 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2−9 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
  OptVol 
Intercept  81.00 a 81.24 a   
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001)   
Perfem  -9.70 b --- -11.21 a --- 
  (0.0199)  (0.0003)  
Blau  --- -7.11 b --- -4.21 c 
   (0.0293)  (0.0774) 
MB  -2.32 a -2.34 a -2.40 a -1.81 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Size  -1.57 a -1.58 a  -1.77a -1.88 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
CASHFLOW  -15.47 -15.62 30.08 a -36.23 a 
  (0.1841) (0.1808) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Lev  -0.91  -0.88  -5.26 a -3.02 
  (0.7569) (0.7659) (0.0086) (0.1309) 
R&D  55.56 a 55.79 a  67.74 a 57.00 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Capex  39.85 a 40.03 a 52.07 a 60.92 a 
  (0.0029) (0.0028) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
BoardSize  -10.08a -10.02 a -9.06 a -7.32 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
OutDirectors  -7.31 a -7.31 a  -5.79 a -4.65 b 
  (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0071) (0.0289) 
      
Industry F.E.   No No Yes Yes 
Year F.E   No No Yes Yes 
      
Adj. R2  21.04% 20.99% 37.08% 44.42% 
N   1,332 1,332 1,332 1,332 
Note: a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 1.7. Does Gender Diversity Affect ROE?  
The first two columns report the results of the financial performance (ROE) model using the fraction  
of female directors (Perfem) and the Blau diversity index. We report the Newey-West t-stat associated  
p-values. The last two columns report the results after controlling for industry and time fixed effects.  
 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =   𝛽1 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2−7 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
  ROE 
Intercept  -0.09 a -0.09 a   
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001)   
Perfem  0.05 a --- 0.05 a --- 
  (<0.0001)  (<0.0001)  
Blau  --- 0.04 a --- 0.03 a 
   (<0.0001)  (<0.0001) 
CurrentRatio  -3.58 c -3.43 -3.03 c -3.81 b 
  (0.0865) (0.1047) (0.0838) (0.0354) 
EqMulti  0.08 a 0.08 a 0.08 a 0.08 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
NetProfit%  0.51 a 0.51 a 0.51 a 0.52 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Asset TO  0.05 a 0.05 a 0.05 a 0.05 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
TIE  0.001 a 0.001b 5.01E-4 a 0.0005 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0001) 
Size  -0.01 a -0.01 a -0.004 a -0.004 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
      
Industry F.E.  No No Yes Yes 
Year F.E.  No No Yes Yes 
      
Adj. R2  74.16% 74.16% 76.54% 77.87% 
N  1,719 1,719 1,719 1,719 
Note: a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
Table 1.8. Propensity Score Matched Sample Results of Firms’ Cash Holdings & 
Expected Volatility  
LIQ columns and OptVol columns report the results of the cash holdings and option implied volatility 
models using the propensity score matched sample and controlling for industry and year fixed effects.  
The sample is matched using probability scores from the logistic regression using firm size, return on 
assets, and leverage as covariates. P-values are in parentheses.  
 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 =   𝛽1 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2−9 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
   LIQ OptVol 
Perfem   -0.19 b --- -0.07 c --- 
   (0.0110)  (0.0946)  
Blau   --- -0.14 a --- -0.05 
    (0.0058)   
MB   0.05 a 0.05 a -0.02 b -0.02 b 
   (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0204) 
Size   -0.02 a -0.01 c -0.03 a -0.03 a 
   (0.0558) (0.0665) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
CASHFLOW   -0.25 c -0.24 -0.29 b -0.28 b 
   (0.0964) (0.1059) (0.0468) (0.0483) 
Lev   -0.16 a -0.16 a -0.13 a -0.13 a 
   (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0053) (0.0052) 
R&D   1.04 a 1.04 a 0.63 a 0.63 a 
   (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Capex   -1.02 a -1.02 a 0.82 a 0.82 a 
   (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
       
Industry F.E.   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E.   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
       
Adj. R2   47.74% 47.89% 21.43% 21.45% 
N   430 430 414 414 
Note: a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
.  
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Table 1.9. Propensity Score Matched Sample Results of Firms’ Return on Equity 
The ROE columns report the results of the financial performance model using the propensity score 
matched sample and controlling for industry and year fixed effects.  The sample is matched using 
probability scores from the logistic regression using firm size and leverage as covariates. P-values are in 
parentheses. 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =   𝛽1 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2−7 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
   ROE 
Perfem   0.05 a --- 
   (0.0055)   
Blau   --- 0.02 b  
    (0.0350)  
CurrentRatio   -0.41 -0.43  
   (0.1899) (0.1712)  
EqMulti   0.07 a 0.07 a  
   (<0.0001) (<0.0001)  
NetProfit%   0.48 a 0.48 a  
   (<0.0001) (<0.0001)  
AssetTO   0.05 a 0.05 a  
   (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
TIE   0.001 a 0.001 a 
   (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Size   -0.01 a -0.01 a 
   (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
     
Industry F.E.   Yes Yes 
Year F.E.    Yes Yes 
     
     
Adj. R2   79.59% 79.38% 
N   430 430 
Note: a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 1.10. Difference-In-Differences: Addition of Second Female Director 
The three columns report the difference-in-differences (DID) regression results for the change in cash 
holdings, change in expected volatility, and change in ROE. Female is a binary variable equal to 1 when a 
board adds a second woman to the board (treatment group) and 0 when there is no woman on the board 
(control group). Period is equal to 1 if the observation is in the post-addition period; 0 otherwise. Δ1 refers 
to the change in the variable of interest for firms that added a second female director. Δ0 is the change in the 
variable of interest for firms that did not add ant female directors. P-values are in parentheses.  
 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
 LIQ  OptVol  ROE  
Intercept 0.0099  21.0743  0.1333  
 (0.4190)  (<0.0001)  (0.9236)  
β3  -0.0131  -16.0253 a  1.6488  
 (0.4466)  (0.0034)  (0.4025)  
       
Δ1 -0.0033  5.0491  1.7821  
       
Δ0 0.0099  21.0744  0.1333  
       
N 74  64  74  
Note: a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 1.11. Difference-In-Differences: Addition of First Female Director 
This table reports the difference-in-differences regression results for the change in cash holdings, change in 
expected volatility, and change in ROE. Female is a binary variable equal to 1 when a board adds a woman 
to the board (treatment group) and 0 when there is no woman on the board (control group). Period is equal 
to 1 if the observation is in the post-addition period; 0 otherwise. Δ1 refers to the change in the variable of 
interest for firms that added a second female director. Δ0 is the change in the variable of interest for firms 
that did not add ant female directors P-values are in parentheses.  
 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
 LIQ  OptVol  ROE  
Intercept 0.0157  30.1230  1.1044  
 (0.3232)  (<0.0001)  (0.8962)  
 β3 0.0108  -17.4180 b  0.4067  
 (0.6296)  (0.0595)  (0.3128)  
       
Δ1 0.0265  12.7050  1.5111  
       
Δ0 0.0157  30.1230  1.1044  
       
N 50  40  50  
Note: a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 1.12. Correlation Between Cash Holdings and Other Measures of Risk 
This table reports the correlation between our measures of risk, firm liquidity (LIQ), option implied 
volatility (OptVol), stock return volatility (TotalRisk), firm-specific volatility (Idiosyncratic Vol), beta,  
and downside risk (Down_Risk). 
 
 LIQ OptVol Total Risk Idio_Vol Beta Down_Risk 
LIQ 
 
1.00 
 
 
0.2566 
<.0001 
 
0.2753 
<.0001 
 
0.2825 
<.0001 
 
0.2392 
<.0001 
 
0.1964 
<.0001 
 
OptVol 
 
 
1.00 
 
 
0.7129 
<.0001 
 
0.7119 
<.0001 
 
0.5657 
<.0001 
 
0.6664 
<.0001 
 
Total Risk 
 
  
1.00 
 
 
0.93975 
<.0001 
 
0.8020 
<.0001 
 
0.8853 
<.0001 
 
Idio_Vol 
 
   
1.00 
 
 
0.6245 
<.0001 
 
0.7970 
<.0001 
 
Beta 
 
    
1.00 
 
 
0.7385 
<.0001 
 
Down_Risk 
 
     
1.00 
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Table 1.13. Regression Analysis with Alternative Risk Measures  
The table reports the panel regressions of beta, idiosyncratic volatility, downside risk, future stock return  
volatility over the next 12 and 24 months on the fraction of female directors (Perfem) and all the control 
variables. All models control for industry and year fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses.  
 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽1 ∗ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2−9 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
  Beta IdioVol Downside SD12 SD24 
Perfem  -1.14 a -0.05 a -0.03 a -0.02 b -0.03 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0348) (0.0182) 
MB  -0.13 a -0.01 a -0.01 a -0.004 a -0.004 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Size  -0.05 b -0.003 a  -0.002 a -0.002 a -0.003 a 
  (0.0206) (0.0011) (<0.0001) (0.0078) (0.0022) 
CASHFLOW  -1.15 c -0.03 -0.01  -0.17 a -0.16 a 
  (0.0676) (0.3350) (0.6523) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Lev  -0.61  -0.01  -0.02 a 0.01 0.01 
  (<0.0001) (0.2061) (0.0011) (0.4039) (0.3943) 
R&D  3.77 a 0.23 a  0.11 a 0.19 a 0.20 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Capex  0.63  0.14 a 0.04  0.21 a 0.21 a 
  (0.4365) (0.0002) (0.1056) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
BoardSize  -0.26 b -0.02 a -0.01 a -0.04 a -0.03 a 
  (0.0392) (0.0018) (0.0042) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
OutDirectors  -0.02  -0.01   -0.01  -0.003 -0.01 
  (0.9026) (0.1193) (0.2398) (0.6731) (0.1885) 
       
Industry F.E.   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time F.E   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Adj. R2  27.11% 31.65% 38.00% 44.50% 44.85% 
N   707 707 707 1,554 1,446 
Note: a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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CHAPTER 2: DO INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AVOID WOMEN?  
2.1. Introduction  
 Financial literature confirms that institutional investors are informed traders. The 
informed trading is due to the collection of private information and/or the ability to analyze 
publicly disclosed information more quickly.  In either case, institutional investors will 
benefit if they invest in firms that disclose poor quality and/or less quantity of information. 
Recent work by Puckett and Yan (2011) finds evidence in support of institutional investors 
being informed traders and find that they prefer trading in stocks in which the public 
information environment is more limited, greater informational asymmetries exist, or 
where limits to arbitrage are higher.   
 In another field of academic research, the extant literature shows that firms with 
gender diverse boards disclose more information and women are more likely to serve on 
monitoring-related committees (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Additionally, research has 
shown that the stock prices of firms with gender diverse boards reflect more information 
as a result of a higher amount of public disclosure (Gul, Srinidhi, & Ng, 2011). Gul, 
Hutchinson, and Lai (2013) suggest that boardroom gender diversity increases the accuracy 
of financial reporting which improves analysts’ earnings expectations.  
Given the evidence on the investment behavior of institutional investors where they 
prefer investing in firms with poor quality disclosure and that gender diverse firms disclose 
better quality and higher quantity of information, we expect institutional investors to prefer 
investing in firms with less gender diversity. In this paper, we study the effect of boardroom 
gender diversity on the level of institutional holdings. Our empirical work suggests that 
firms with more gender diversity tend to have lower levels of institutional ownership.  
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We use two measures of boardroom gender diversity: the percentage of female 
directors on the board and the Blau diversity index.12 We find that firms with more gender 
diversity have significantly lower levels of institutional holdings than firms with less 
diversity. More specifically our univariate analysis indicates that institutional investors 
hold 4.15% more shares in non-diverse firms. In our multivariate analysis we use the 
estimated regression model to compare the difference in institutional ownership between 
diverse and non-diverse firms. Using the proportion of female directors as a measure of 
gender diversity, we find that institutional investors hold 8.82% less shares in firms with 
boardroom gender diversity.13 Similarly, using the Blau diversity index, we find that 
institutional investors hold 8.27% less shares in firms with gender diversity.  
 A critical concern for our empirical analysis is endogeneity. For example, on the 
one hand we know gender diverse firms disclose more and higher quality information, 
which decreases information asymmetry. As a result, we hypothesize and provide evidence 
that institutional investors have less holdings in gender diverse firms. On the other hand, it 
may be possible that female directors prefer to work for firms with fewer institutional 
investors because such investors may use their relatively large ownership stakes to demand 
changes to the firm’s corporate governance policy, such as altering the composition of the 
board of directors. We address our endogeneity concerns by implementing several 
robustness tests. First, we generate a propensity score matched sample using financial 
                                                     
12 The proportion of female directors on the board is a better measure than an indicator variable because it 
measures the influence of gender diversity. For example, two boards have one female director each but 
consist of a different number of directors. The smaller-sized board will be more influenced by the female 
director than the larger board. The Blau index further captures nonlinear effects that diversity may have on 
the firm.  
 
13 We use the estimated model in Table 6 and compare firms with 20% and 0% female representation using 
the median values of the control variables.  
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performance to generate probability scores and match the firms by the smallest difference 
in probability scores. We find that institutional ownership is significantly lower for firms 
with gender diversity. We then implement a difference-in-differences (DID) analysis in 
which we compare the changes in institutional ownership for firms which did not have any 
female directors (control group) with firms that added female directors to the board 
(treatment group). We find that institutional ownership decreases for the control group and 
treatment group by 0.84% and 4.17%, respectively. Overall, institutional ownership 
decreased by 3.33% more for firms that added a female director as compared to firms that 
did not add a female director.  
Current literature also suggests that institutional investors have a monitoring role 
on the firm, i.e. the larger the institutional following the more information about the firm 
available in the market. Hence, more institutional following increases the number of 
informed traders competing amongst each other for informational advantages and increases 
the availability of information. As a robustness check, we study whether institutional 
following affects the inverse relationship between gender diversity and informed trading. 
We find that institutional investors prefer to invest less in gender diverse firms with more 
institutional following which may be due to higher information disclosure in gender diverse 
firms and increased monitoring, both of which increase firm-specific information. Higher 
gender diversity in firms with greater institutional following negatively impacts 
institutional holdings.  
Moreover, we examine the effect of gender diversity on institutional holdings for 
various types of institutions such as banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, and hedge 
funds. We find these types of institutions invest less in gender diverse firms, which is 
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consistent with our prior findings. This is also consistent with the notion that these types 
of institutions have superior informational advantages over uninformed traders.  
 The implications of our study reveals the important role that gender diversity has 
in the composition of informed and uninformed traders in firms’ stock prices. Gender 
diversity through public disclosure and institutional investors through trading on their 
analytical expertise and private information both increase the informational content of 
stock prices. Our results suggest that gender diversity may be a factor in improving the 
informational content of asset prices and, thus, on a larger scale suggests that board gender 
diversity may improve the informational efficiency of financial markets. Lastly, our results 
suggest that gender diversity is an important determinant in institutions’ investment 
decisions as we find that institutions systematically invest less in gender diverse firms. 
 The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the literature and 
presents our hypothesis. Section 2.3 describes the data. Section 2.4 reviews our model. 
Section 2.5 presents the results of our empirical study. Section 2.6 concludes.  
2.2. Prior literature and Hypothesis Development  
 The extant literature provides evidence that gender diverse boards improve the 
quality of information disclosure by firms. Adams and Ferreira (2009) report that women 
are more likely to participate in audit and monitoring-relating committees and are more 
stringent monitors of management. Moreover, Barber and Odean (2001) suggest that 
female directors are more risk averse and less overconfident than male directors which 
could cause female directors to increase the standards of management’s financial reporting. 
Thus, if gender diversity improves corporate governance through more effective 
45 
 
monitoring of firms’ management, then gender diversity is expected to be positively related 
to benchmarks that proxy for firm-specific information.  
 Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui (2011) study the effect of boardroom gender diversity on 
earnings quality using accruals and earnings surprises as measures of earnings quality and 
control for several board characteristics. The authors report that gender diverse firms are 
positively related to higher earnings quality. Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng (2011) show that the 
stock prices of firms with gender-diverse boards reflect more firm-specific information and 
the relationship is more salient for firms with weak governance. Additionally, the authors 
find that gender diversity increases the informational content of stock prices through 
increased public disclosures. Gul, Hutchinson, and Lai (2013) report a positive (negative) 
relationship between analysts’ earnings estimates (dispersion) and suggest that boardroom 
gender diversity increases the accuracy of financial reporting, which allows analysts to 
provide increasingly refined earnings expectations.  
 In general, prior literature finds that gender diversity in a firm’s board increases 
transparency through more and better quality disclosure of firm-specific information as a 
result of increased monitoring and behavioral differences in risk aversion and 
overconfidence. 
 Information asymmetry arises when investors have varying levels of private 
information about the firm’s fundamental value. Traders with the superior information sets 
take advantage of less informed traders.14 Kyle (1985) shows that informed trading varies 
                                                     
14 Traders with superior information sets are referred to as “informed traders.” Traders with inferior 
information sets are referred to as “uninformed traders” or “noise traders.” Additionally, “liquidity traders” 
trade on the need to rebalance their investments (liquidity-need) or speculation. Thus, liquidity traders 
sometimes trade like noise traders; however, their motivations are not necessarily the same.  
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according to the proportion of uninformed traders in the market. Brown, Hillegeist, and Lo 
(2004) find that the proportion of informed traders decreases relative to the proportion of 
uninformed traders when a firm voluntarily discloses information. Additionally, Brown 
and Hillegeist (2007) examine the mechanisms through which disclosure quality reduces 
information asymmetry and find that information asymmetry, measured as the probability 
of informed trading (PIN), is negatively related to various measures of disclosure quality. 
The authors conclude that the negative relationship between disclosure quality and 
information asymmetry is due to the reduction in investors’ incentives to collect private 
information.15  
 In short, the existing literature supports the idea that disclosure quality is negatively 
related to information asymmetry because it decreases informed traders’ incentives to 
collect private information and decreases the relative proportion of informed trading.    
 There is extensive prior literature on who is an informed trader. Boehmer and 
Kelley (2009) show that greater institutional ownership is associated with significantly 
greater informational efficiency. They show that stocks with larger increases in holdings 
experience greater increases in efficiency, and those with large reductions in holdings 
experience declines in efficiency. Many studies suggest that institutional investors have 
superior information sets because of their ability to attain such information sets cheaply. 
O’Neill and Swisher (2003) write, “Institutional investors are often considered informed 
traders because of their lower average costs to acquire information. Consequently, 
                                                     
15 The probability of informed trading (PIN) is measured as: 𝑃𝐼𝑁 =  
𝛼𝜇
𝛼𝜇+2𝜀
 where α is the frequency of 
private information events, μ is the intensity of informed trading, and ε is the intensity of uninformed 
trading.  
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institutions can be both more efficient in processing information and more effective as 
traders and monitors than can smaller, diffuse retail investors.” Puckett and Yan (2011) 
find strong evidence that institutional investors earn significant abnormal returns on their 
trades within the trading quarter, indicating that they are informed traders. They conjecture 
that profitable trading opportunities are more likely to arise in stocks where the public 
information environment is more limited, greater information asymmetries exist, or limits 
to arbitrage are higher. Their results are consistent with institutions being able to exploit 
temporary mispricing in situations where information asymmetry and limits to arbitrage 
are high. 
 Vayanos (1999) develops theoretical results indicating that institutional investors 
trade based on their private information. Chakravarty (2001) investigates the stealth-
trading hypothesis, which argues that informed investors conceal their private information 
in medium-sized trades. He finds that most of the cumulative price change in stock prices 
is associated with medium-sized trades initiated by institutions. Ali, Klasa, and Li (2008) 
use institutional ownership as a proxy for the proportion of better informed traders. The 
authors find that institutions have incentives to develop private, pre-disclosure information 
and trade on it. They conclude that institutional ownership is a fine proxy for the proportion 
of informed traders at earnings announcements. Ajinkya, Bhojraj and Sengupta (2005) 
investigate the relation of the board of directors and institutional ownership with the 
properties of management earnings forecasts. They find that firms with more outside 
directors and greater institutional ownership are more likely to issue a forecast and are 
inclined to forecast more frequently. In addition, these forecasts tend to be more specific, 
accurate, and less optimistically biased.  
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 Discussion in section 2.1 highlights the association between gender diversity and 
disclosure quality through increased monitoring effectiveness. In section 2.2, we discuss 
that increased disclosure quality is negatively associated with information asymmetry. The 
decrease in information asymmetry lowers the proportion of informed trading and 
decreases the incentive for acquiring private information.  
 Institutional investors are more sophisticated traders who take advantage of their 
superior information set through trading. We posit that if gender diversity increases 
information disclosure quality and if higher disclosure quality decreases information 
asymmetry, then gender diverse firms will have less institutional ownership because such 
informed traders will not be able to take advantage of the information environment of 
gender diverse firms.  
Hypothesis: Higher gender diversity has a negative effect on institutional ownership.  
𝐻𝑜: 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡. 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖
1 − 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡. 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖
0 ≥ 0 
𝐻𝐴: 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡. 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖
1 − 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡. 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖
0 < 0 
where the superscript of 1 denotes firms with more gender diversity and 0 denotes firms 
with less gender diversity.   
2.3. Data and Sample Overview  
 
 We collect the data on board of directors’ composition from GMI Ratings available 
on Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). The board composition data is increasingly 
available from 2001-2013 for many S&P 500 companies. We collect firm-specific data for 
the control variables from Compustat and daily stock return data for sample firms from 
CRSP. We use I/B/E/S for the number of analysts for each firm and keep only those firms 
in our sample that have at least one analyst recommendation.  
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 The SEC requires ownership data and holdings to be publicly disclosed using Form 
13F under Section 13(f) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, which includes the largest 
number of institutional investors. These aptly named 13F institutions have at least $100 
million in investments. We collect the institutional ownership data from the SEC 13(f) 
filings. To classify the institutional ownership data by institution type we use the 
classification made by Agarwal, Jiang, Tang, and Yang (2013). Agarwal et al. (2013) 
manually reclassify the five institution types reported in Thompson Reuters 13F database 
into 10 distinct institution types, which are listed in Appendix A.16 
 The intersection of all five data sources17 and data requirements reduce the size of 
our sample to 410 firms and 3,540 firm-year observations. The exclusion of finance 
(NAICS 52) and utility companies (NAICS 22) further reduces the sample in the regression 
models. Table 2.1 reports the firm-year average of institutional ownership and institutional 
following. The average institutional ownership of a firm is between 62.32% of shares 
outstanding in 2001 and 68.81% of shares outstanding in 2013. Similarly, the average 
number of institutions that own shares in a firm range from 364 in 2001 to 524 institutions 
in 2013. Table 2.1 also shows that about half of the institutional holdings is held by no 
more than 16 institutions, on average. In Table 2.2, we report the firm-year average of 
institutional ownership for different levels of gender diversity. We show that firms with no 
female directors have institutional ownership levels of 70.15%. Similarly, firms whose 
boards consist of 30% to 40% females have institutional ownership levels of 61.57%.  
 
                                                     
16 We thank Dr. Vikas Agarwal for sharing the institutional classification data. 
 
17 WRDS, Compustat, CRSP, 13F, and data from Agarwal, Jiang, Tang, and Yang (2013) 
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2.4. Methodology  
 For our univariate analysis of institutional ownership we divide the sample into two 
groups, firms with no female directors and firms with at least one female director.  
Then, we test our institutional ownership model, which includes measures of board 
diversity while controlling for firm-specific drivers of information asymmetry. We test the 
following model to relate boardroom gender diversity to institutional ownership,  
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡. 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 
                                   +𝛽4𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 
        +𝛽8𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝑦𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(1) 
We use two measures of diversity in our institutional ownership model, Perfem and Blau. 
Perfem is the number of female directors divided by the number of directors. This linear 
measure of diversity fails to parsimoniously capture the effect of diversity with increasing 
gender diversity. Hence, we construct the Blau (1977) diversity index for each firm-year 
as follows:  
𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑢 = 1 − ∑ 𝑃𝑖
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
The Blau diversity index measures the diversity of a group using the proportion, Pi, of 
subgroups in the group.18 We expect our diversity measures to be negatively associated 
with institutional ownership given that gender diversity increases disclosure quality, which 
decreases information asymmetry. As a result, informed traders such as institutional 
investors cannot take complete advantage of their superior information set in gender 
diverse firms.  
                                                     
18 In this case, the group (board of directors) has two subgroups (male and female). Thus, a perfectly 
diverse board would have a maximum Blau index score of 0.50 and a non-diverse board would have a Blau 
index score of 0. Lastly, boards with 30% females have the same Blau index score as a board with 30% 
males because the diversity level is the same. This is the major advantage of using the Blau index over 
perfem. 
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 The previous literature associates a number of variables with firms’ level of 
institutional ownership. Upadhyay and Sriram (2011) find that board size is positively 
associated with the firm’s information environment using different proxies of information 
transparency. Additionally, the authors suggest that investors perceive firms with larger 
boards to have a richer information environment, which leads to a lower cost of capital for 
the firm. We measure board size (BSize) as the natural logarithm of the total number of 
directors on the board. Since board size is positively related to a firm’s information 
environment and institutions prefer higher levels of information asymmetry, we expect 
lower institutional ownership for firms with larger boards. Miller and Modigliani (1961) 
suggest that managers use dividend payout policy to signal information about the firm’s 
future earnings. Amihud and Li (2006) examine the declining information content of 
dividend announcements and find that a reason for the decline in information content is 
explained by the increase in institutional ownership over time. This suggests that because 
institutional investors are sophisticated and more informed, they are able to embed their 
private information into stock prices, which contributes to the declining information 
content of dividend payout policy. We use an indicator variable (Div) equal to one if the 
firm announces a dividend in the fiscal year and zero if the firm did not announce a 
dividend. If dividends contain information about the future earnings of a firm, then we 
expect firms that make dividend announcements to have less institutional ownership.  
 Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin (2003) compute idiosyncratic volatility by 
regressing weekly returns on market and industry returns and conclude that higher firm-
specific stock return volatility signals more information-rich stock prices and more 
efficient stock markets. We measure idiosyncratic volatility (IdioRisk) as the standard 
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deviation of the residuals from regressing daily stock returns on daily S&P 500 returns.19 
We expect lower institutional ownership for firms with higher firm-specific stock return 
variation because the stock prices of such firms contain more information and, thus, are 
more efficiently priced. Furthermore, previous studies proxy information asymmetry with 
firm size and argue that larger firms are more visible and, therefore, have less information 
asymmetry (Chari, Jagannathan, & Ofer, 1988; Lo & MacKinlay 1990; Llorente, Michaely, 
Saar, & Wang, 2002). We expect firm size (Size) to be negatively related with institutional 
ownership, i.e. larger firms have more public following, and thus, informed traders are less 
attracted to such visible firms. McLaughlin, Saffieddine, and Vasudevan (1998) use a 
firm’s market-to-book (MktBook) as a proxy for information asymmetry and suggest that 
growth opportunities and overvaluation are likely to be related with information 
asymmetries. We control for a firm’s MktBook ratio in our institutional holdings model 
and expect institutional investors to own a larger stake in firms with higher MktBook ratios 
to profit from their private information. Tong and Ning (2004) study a panel of S&P 500 
firms and find that capital structure influences institutional investors’ decisions to invest in 
firms. Michaely, Popadak, and Vincent (2014) find that increases in institutional ownership 
accounts for the deleveraging of U.S. corporations since 1992. We control for firm leverage 
(Lev), measured as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, in the institutional ownership 
model.   
 Additionally, we control for firm stock illiquidity (Illiq) using a variant of 
Amihud’s (2002) measure employed by Hasbrouck (2009). This measure is computed as 
                                                     
19 We estimate 𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑡 = 𝛽0,𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1,𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑚𝑑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑑𝑡 using daily firm and S&P 500 returns for the fiscal year t. 
After estimating β1, we compute firm-specific risk by subtracting systematic risk from total variance using 
the following decomposition of total variance: 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 =  𝛽𝑖
2𝜎𝑚𝑡
2 + 𝜎𝜀𝑡
2 . 
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the firm’s yearly average of the square root of absolute return divided by dollar volume.20 
Higher volume decreases illiquidity, which attracts informed traders because they are better 
able to mask their trades and execute them without much price impact. Thus, we expect 
higher institutional holdings for firms with lower illiquidity. Lastly, we control for analyst 
following (Recs) using the average number of analysts that follow a firm in a given year. 
A higher analyst following contributes to a richer public information set, which makes it 
more difficult for informed institutions to gain an advantage over uninformed traders. Thus, 
we expect lower institutional ownership for firms with higher analyst following.  
2.5. Empirical Results  
 We report firm-year summary statistics in Table 2.1. The table shows that the 
average level of institutional ownership has slightly increased from 62.32% in 2001 to 
68.81% in 2013. Similarly, the average number of institutions investing in each firm has 
increased from 364 in 2001 to 524 institutions in 2013. The table also reports the average 
number of institutions that own at least 1% of all shares outstanding and the average 
fraction of shares outstanding held by these top institutions. The latter is roughly time 
invariant. Table 2.2 reports average institutional ownership levels by diversity tranches. 
We report a decreasing trend in institutional ownership as gender diversity increases. In 
Table 2.3 we report the descriptive statistics of diverse and non-diverse firms as indicated 
by a binary variable equal to 1 if there is at least one woman on the board and 0 otherwise. 
The mean and median amounts of institutional holdings are higher for firms without any 
female directors. For example, in non-diverse firms institutions own approximately 71% 
                                                     
20 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡 =  √
|𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑑,𝑡|
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑑,𝑡
 for firm i in year t using daily returns, d 
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of the shares outstanding while in diverse firms institutions own approximately 66% of 
shares outstanding.  
 In Table 2.4 we provide our univariate analysis comparing the differences in 
institutional ownership by the presence of female directors on the board. We report that 
firms with female directors have significantly lower institutional ownership levels. The 
results also hold when we exclude tracking institutions.21 Both univariate results are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Table 2.5 reports the differences in mean 
institutional ownership between firms with gender diversity and without diversity sorted 
into quintiles by institutional following. Firms in Q5 have the highest number of 
institutions investing in the company. Conversely, firms in Q1 have the least number of 
institutions with ownership stakes in the company. We report that gender diverse firms 
with more institutional following have significantly less institutional ownership than firms 
without female directors. At the lowest quintile, gender diverse firms have higher levels of 
institutional ownership. The results suggest that firms with more institutional following are 
likely to be more well-known and more closely followed by traders and analysts. This 
increased public scrutiny may contribute to a richer information set, which would 
contribute to lower institutional ownership levels in gender diverse firms. On the other 
hand, less institutional following results in less public information, which may attract 
higher levels of institutional ownership.  
                                                     
21 We define tracking institutions as those institutions that invest in all sample firms in a given year. For 
example, if there are 250 firms in 2001 and an institution invests in all 250 firms, then we designate it a 
tracking institution and remove it from the analysis because these institutions are not making specific 
investment decisions or incorporating unique trading strategies. They are simply tracking the index.  
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 In Table 2.6 we examine the multivariate relationship between gender diversity and 
institutional ownership. When we use all institutional-level data in the regression, we find 
that both diversity measures are negative and significant at the 1% level with a p-value less 
than 0.0001. Further analysis shows that the model does not hold when analyzing the 
institutional ownership levels of tracking institutions. Since tracking institutions do not 
distinguish between their investment choices, they are not trading based on some acquired 
information set. Thus, it is important to exclude such institutions from the empirical 
analysis. We find, the results excluding tracking institutions to be similar to the results 
when using all institutions. Both diversity measures are negative and significant at the 1% 
level when excluding tracking institutions. The coefficients of the information-related 
control variables indicate a negative relationship between a firm’s information 
environment and institutional ownership. For example, larger firms have lower institutional 
ownership. Similarly, firms with higher idiosyncratic volatility, higher analyst following, 
and larger boards have lower institutional ownership levels on average.   
 In Tables 2.7 and 2.8 we examine whether institution following impacts the 
relationship between gender diversity and institutional ownership. We report a negative 
and significant relationship between gender diversity and institutional ownership for the 
firms in the quintile with the highest institutional followings (Q5, Q4, and Q3). For firms 
with lower institutional following (Q1 and Q2), neither diversity measure is statistically 
significant. These results are consistent with the univariate results reported in Table 4. 
Higher gender diversity in firms with greater institutional following negatively impacts 
institutional holdings. However, gender diversity does not seem to impact institutional 
holdings for the least followed firms.  
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 Next, we test whether the inverse relationship between gender diversity and 
institutional ownership varies by institution-type. We restrict our analysis to the first five 
types of institutions as these institutions make up approximately 90% to 95% of all 
institutions. In Tables 2.9 and 2.10 the results suggest that banks, insurance companies, 
and mutual funds invest less in firms with more board gender diversity. Although not 
statistically significant, hedge funds and other asset management firms also invest less in 
more gender diverse firms. Since the results are generated using end-of-year data it is 
possible that window dressing may be adversely impacting our results for hedge funds and 
asset management firms. Nonetheless, the results are consistent with our hypothesis that 
institutional investors own less shares in firms with richer information sets.  
 To address possible selection bias and endogeneity concerns, we apply a propensity 
score matched sample approach controlling for financial performance and match control 
firms to treatment firms by the smallest difference in firm size and year. Additionally, we 
control for industry and year fixed effects. The results in Table 2.11 report that the 
coefficient on Perfem and Blau is negative and significant at the 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. In Table 2.12, we report the results from our DID study. We report that non-
diverse firms (control group) had a decrease in institutional ownership of 84 basis points 
between pre- and post-treatment periods. Firms that added a woman to the board (treatment 
group) had a decrease in institutional ownership of 417 basis points. The decrease 
institutional ownership levels for the treatment group is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. Lastly, the DID between the two groups is a decrease of 333 basis points in 
institutional ownership.   
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2.6. Conclusion  
 In this essay, we examine the relationship between board gender diversity and 
institutional ownership levels of non-financial S&P 500 firms. We report that board gender 
diversity is inversely related to the proportion of shares outstanding held by institutions. 
Moreover, we find that the inverse relationship between gender diversity and institutional 
ownership is stronger for firms with higher levels of institutional following. Additionally, 
we use institutional ownership data to classify institutions by type such as banks, mutual 
funds, and hedge funds. We find that banks, insurance companies, and mutual funds invest 
less in gender diverse firms. Forhedge funds and asset management firms we do not find 
any statistically significant influence of gender diversity but these results may be due to 
window dressing. Our results are robust to several endogeneity tests. The propensity score 
matched sample and difference-in-differences analysis indicate that higher levels for 
gender diversity leads to a statistically and economically significant level of institutional 
ownership in firms.  
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of Institutional Holdings  
Inst. Holdings is the cross-sectional average of the fraction of total shares outstanding held by 13F 
institutions. Avg. No. Inst. is the average number of 13F institutions with investments in a company. Top. 
Inst. is the average number of institutions that own at least 1% of a company. Top Holdings is the cross-
sectional average of the fraction of total shares outstanding held by the top institutions.  
 
Year Inst. Holdings Avg. No. Inst. Top Inst. (>1%)  Top Holdings (>1%) 
2001 62.32% 364 13 34.60% 
2002 64.27% 377 14 37.35% 
2003 65.50% 404 13 35.68% 
2004 67.36% 421 14 38.19% 
2005 66.97% 434 14 39.72% 
2006 69.04% 446 15 42.45% 
2007 71.55% 483 15 41.51% 
2008 69.17% 439 14 41.37% 
2009 67.71% 437 15 41.68% 
2010 71.63% 451 16 45.74% 
2011 69.73% 455 15 45.62% 
2012 69.24% 445 15 44.13% 
2013 68.81% 524 13 37.51% 
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Table 2.2: Average Institutional Holdings By Diversity Tranches  
% Female Directors is the proportion of female directors on the board. Firm-Years is the 
Number of firm-year observations in each diversity tranche. Avg. Inst. Holdings is the  
average fraction of shares outstanding held institutions in each diversity tranche. No. Inst. 
is the number of 13F institutions in each diversity tranche.  
 
% Female Directors Firms Firm-Years Avg. Inst. Holdings No. Inst. 
0% 128 448 70.15% 3,899 
0.1% to 10% 205 751 67.88% 4,219 
10.01% to 20% 317 1564 68.60% 4,472 
20.01% to 30% 158 546 67.58% 4,211 
30.01% to 40% 53 151 61.57% 3,529 
40.01% to 50% 11 23 59.10% 2,498 
>50% 1 4 78.06% 622 
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Table 2.3. Descriptive Statistics, 2001-2013 
The descriptive statistics of the sample are presented in two groups: firms with no gender diversity (Female = 0) 
and firms with gender diversity (Female = 1). N is the number for firm-year observations. Mean is the average of  
the firm-year observations for each variable. Med is the median observation. Std Dev is the standard deviation of 
the variable of interest. Min and Max are the minimum and maximum value of the variable. Variable definitions 
are provided in Appendix B. 
 
 
 
Female = 0 
  
Female =1 
 N Mean Med St Dev Min Max 
 
N Mean Med St Dev Min Max 
Dependent Variables       
 
      
Inst. Holdings 448 0.68 0.71 0.14 0.07 0.91 
 
3,039 0.65 0.66 0.12 0.22 0.92 
Independent Variables       
 
      
BoardSize 448 2.12 2.08 0.21 1.61 2.77 
 
3,067 2.36 2.40 0.19 1.61 2.94 
Mktbook 398 1.92 1.46 1.33 0.30 7.50 
 
2,624 1.76 1.40 1.25 0.28 13.05 
Leverage 464 0.20 0.19 0.16 0 0.99 
 
3,044 0.22 0.21 0.15 0 1.56 
Div 471 0.61 1 0.49 0 1 
 
3,035 0.77 1 0.42 0 1 
Idiosyncratic 473 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.001 0.08 
 
3,067 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.005 0.10 
Illiq 473 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.002 0.17 
 
3,067 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.001 1.46 
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Table 2.3 (Continued). Descriptive Statistics, 2001-2013 
 
  Female = 0  Female =1 
 N Mean Med St Dev Min Max  N Mean Med St Dev Min Max 
Recs 473 19.00 18.08 7.95 1 43.92  3,067 17.83 16.75 7.88 1 54.92 
Size 473 8.69 8.66 0.92 6.23 11.06  3,067 9.29 9.19 1.17 6.22 13.59 
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Table 2.4: Univariate Analysis: Proportion of Firm Float Held by Institutional Investors  
N is the number of firm-year observations. μ0 (μ1) is the average proportion of shares outstanding in non-diverse (diverse) firms held by institutions.  
Std Dev is the standard deviation of the fraction of shares held by institutions. Min and Max is the minimum and maximum proportion of shares  
outstanding held by institutions. All Inst. Ex. Trackers excludes institutions that invest in every firm in the sample in a given year and institutions that invest 
in only one firm in a given year.  
 
    
 N μ0  Std Dev Min Max N μ1  Std Dev Min Max μ1 – μ0 
All Institutions 448 0.6799 0.1361 0.0663 0.9179 3039 0.6528 0.1202 0.2183 0.9234 -0.0271 a 
All Inst. Ex. 
Trackers 
448 0.4116 0.1283 0.0318 0.8241 3039 0.3966 0.1234 0.0601 0.8775 -0.0180 a 
Note: a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 2.5: Univariate Analysis: Institutional Following   
Firms are sorted by institutional following; defined as the number of institutions investing in a firm in a given year. Q1 corresponds to the quintile 
that includes firms with the smallest institutional following. Conversely, Q5 is the quintile that includes firms with the highest institutional following.   
μ0 (μ1) is the average proportion of shares outstanding in non-diverse (diverse) firms held by institutions. All Inst. Ex. Trackers excludes institutions that 
invest in every firm in the sample in a given year and institutions that invest in only one firm in a given year.  
 
All Institutions  All Institutions Ex. Trackers 
 μ0 (Female =0)   μ1 (Female = 1) μ1 – μ0 μ0 (Female =0)   μ1 (Female = 1) μ1 – μ0 
Q1 – Lowest 0.6597 0.7044 0.0447 a 0.2947 0.3315 0.0368 a 
Q2 0.7047 0.7171 0.0124 0.3040 0.3224 0.0184 b 
Q3 0.7438 0.7015 -0.0423 a 0.3455 0.3166 -0.0289 a 
Q4 0.7142 0.6807 -0.0336 a 0.3232 0.3018 -0.0214 b 
Q5 – Highest 0.6545 0.6013 -0.0532 b 0.2984 0.2517 -0.0467 a 
Note: a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 2.6: Does Gender Diversity Explain Institutional Holdings?  
Perfem is the proportion of female directors on the board. Blau is a diversity index. BoardSize is the natural 
logarithm of the number of directors on the board. MktBook is a firm’s market-to-book ratio. Leverage is a 
firm’s debt-to-total assets ratio. Div is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm paid out a dividend in a 
given year. Idiosyncratic is a firm’s diversifiable risk computed using the market model. Illiq is the 
modified Amihud illiquidity measure. Recs is the average number of analyst recommendations for the firm. 
Size is the natural log of a firm’s total assets. All Inst. Ex. Trackers excludes institutions that invest in every 
firm in the sample in a given year and institutions that invest in only one firm in a given year.  
 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡. 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
  
All  
Institutions 
Tracking Institutions 
All Ex. Tracking 
Institutions 
Perfem  -0.1234 a --- 0.0086 - -0.0796 a --- 
  (<0.0001)  (0.6724)  (<0.0001)  
Blau  --- -0.0747 a --- 0.0108 --- -0.0444 a 
   (<0.0001)  (0.4825)  (0.0032) 
BoardSize  -0.0389 a -0.0390 a -0.0277 a -0.0284 a -0.0237 b -0.0241 b 
  (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0057) (0.0049) (0.0135) (0.0126) 
MktBook  -0.0851 -0.0903 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
  (0.5393) (0.5154) (0.7930) (0.7906) (0.5573) (0.5351) 
Leverage  0.0312 b 0.0305 b 0.0670 a 0.0669 a 0.0010 0.0005 
  (0.0280) (0.0318) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.9337) (0.9690) 
Div  -0.0262 a -0.0271 a 0.0005 0.0004 -0.0212 a -0.0219 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.9134) (0.9155) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Idiosyncratic  -0.4095 -0.4206 -0.0373 -0.0289 -0.7903 a -0.7953 a 
  (0.1892) (0.1784) (0.8697) (0.8988) (0.0026) (0.0025) 
Illiq  -0.0762 a -0.0747 a -0.0380 -0.0380 -0.0203 -0.0193 
  (0.0040) (0.0048) (0.1064) (0.1065) (0.3605) (0.3868) 
Recs  -0.0012 a -0.0012 a 0.0014 a 0.0014 a -0.0013 a -0.0013 a 
  (<0.0001) (0.0002) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Size  -0.0273 a -0.0274 a -0.0056 a -0.0057 a -0.0233 a -0.0233 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0032) (0.0031) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
        
IndustryF.E.  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time F.E.  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Adj. R2  24.13% 23.88% 2.09% 2.11% 23.26% 23.01% 
N  2,994 2,994 2,994 2,994 2,994 2,994 
Note: a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 2.7: Does Institutional Following Impact the Effect of Diversity on Institutional 
Ownership?  
Perfem is the proportion of female directors on the board. BoardSize is the natural logarithm of the number 
of directors on the board. MktBook is a firm’s market-to-book ratio. Leverage is a firm’s debt-to-total assets 
ratio. Div is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm paid out a dividend in a given year. Idiosyncratic 
is a firm’s diversifiable risk computed using the market model. Illiq is the modified Amihud illiquidity 
measure. Recs is the average number of analyst recommendations for the firm. Size is the natural log of a 
firm’s total assets.  
 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡. 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
      
Intercept 0.8044 a 1.0748 a 0.6845 a 0.5989 a 1.3531 a 
 (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Perfem -0.0774 -0.0060  -0.1226 b -0.1599 a -0.1706 a 
 (0.1806) (0.9177) (0.0417) (0.0020) (0.0023) 
BoardSize -0.0494 c -0.0792 a -0.0463 -0.0075  0.0069 
 (0.0626) (0.0051) (0.1288) (0.7753) (0.7948) 
MktBook -0.0144 b -0.0093 a -0.0006 -0.0001  -0.0274 a 
 (0.0264) (0.0002) (0.7884) (0.8319) (<0.0001) 
Leverage -0.0119 0.0909 a -0.0492  -0.0680 c -0.0389 
 (0.6999) (0.0079) (0.2155) (0.0520) (0.3162) 
Div -0.0165 -0.0270 b -0.0326 a -0.0479 a  0.0134  
 (0.1662) (0.0209) (0.0100) (0.0002) (0.4222) 
Idiosyncratic -1.7728 a -0.5427 0.2075  -1.4172 b  0.1622  
 (0.0013) (0.3354) (0.9693) (0.0483) (0.8613) 
Illiq -0.0878 0.0031 -0.0177 0.1708 -9.5129 a 
 (0.2187) (0.9311) (0.7906) (0.6402) (0.0032) 
Recs -0.0030 a -0.0031 a -0.0006 -0.0020 -0.0015 b 
 (0.0002) (<0.0001) (0.4733) (0.0063) (0.0148) 
Size -0.0195 b -0.0465 a -0.0105 -0.0079  -0.0799 a 
 (0.0420) (<0.0001) (0.2411) (0.2364) (<0.0001) 
      
Adj. R2 5.60% 11.05% 4.51% 5.86% 20.48% 
N 589 576 598 625 606 
Note: a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 2.8: Does Institutional Following Impact the Effect of Diversity on Institutional 
Ownership? Excluding Tracking Institutions.  
Blau is a diversity index. MktBook is a firm’s market-to-book ratio. Leverage is a firm’s debt-to-total assets 
ratio. Div is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm paid out a dividend in a given year. Abnormal 
Return is the geometric mean of a firm’s daily excess return above its expected return using the market 
model in the a given year. Idiosyncratic is a firm’s diversifiable risk computed using the market model. Size 
is the natural log of a firm’s total assets. Institutional Holdings is computed without tracking institutions or 
institutions that invest in solely one firm in a given year.  
 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡. 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
      
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
      
Intercept 0.8119 a 1.0787 a 0.6842 a 0.6046 a 1.3481 a 
 (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Blau -0.0241 0.0269  -0.0772 c -0.1381 a -0.1298 a 
 (0.5667) (0.5167) (0.0873) (0.0005) (0.0039) 
BoardSize -0.0540 b -0.0860 a -0.0475 0.0114  0.0077  
 (0.0429) (0.0026) (0.1233) (0.6696) (0.7712) 
MktBook -0.0144 b -0.0094 a -0.0006 -0.0001  -0.0271 a 
 (0.0261) (0.0002) (0.7781) (0.8265) (<0.0001) 
Leverage -0.0113 0.0884 a -0.0509  -0.0677 c -0.0378 
 (0.7142) (0.0097) (0.2006) (0.0518) (0.3319) 
Div -0.0168 -0.0268 b  -0.0333 a -0.0489 a  0.0128  
 (0.1578) (0.0220) (0.0085) (0.0002) (0.4452) 
Idiosyncratic -1.7673 a -0.5274 0.0024  -1.4829 b  3.5939 c 
 (0.0014) (0.3493) (0.9974) (0.0386) (0.0655) 
Illiq -0.0855 0.0035 -0.0153 0.1776 -9.3082 a 
 (0.2313) (0.9215) (0.8186) (0.6263) (0.0039) 
Recs -0.0029 a -0.0030 a -0.0006 -0.0020 a -0.0014 b 
 (0.0003) (<0.0001) (0.4743) (0.0047) (0.0172) 
Size -0.0199 b -0.0460 a -0.0099  -0.0082  -0.0793 a 
 (0.0381) (<0.0001) (0.2656) (0.2195) (<0.0001) 
      
      
Adj. R2 5.36% 11.11% 4.31% 6.26% 20.34% 
N 589 576 598 625 606 
Note: a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 2.9: Does Diversity Affect Institution-Type Ownership Differently?  
Perfem is the proportion of female directors on the board. BoardSize is the natural logarithm of the number 
of directors on the board. MktBook is a firm’s market-to-book ratio. Leverage is a firm’s debt-to-total assets 
ratio. Div is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm paid out a dividend in a given year. Idiosyncratic 
is a firm’s diversifiable risk computed using the market model. Illiq is the modified Amihud illiquidity 
measure. Recs is the average number of analyst recommendations for the firm. Size is the natural log of a 
firm’s total assets. Inst. Holdings excludes institutions that invest in every firm in the sample in a given 
year and institutions that invest in only one firm in a given year. The subscript z is an indicator for the type 
of institutions. Inst. Holdings is computed by type of institution when z is indicated.  
.  
 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡. 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝑧 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑡,𝑧 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡,𝑧 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡,𝑧 
 
 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Type 5 
      
Intercept 0.0380 a 0.0255 a 0.1508 a 0.1756 a 0.3235 a 
 (0.0002) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Perfem -0.0224 b -0.0112 a -0.0533 a -0.0121  -0.0085  
 (0.0154) (0.0058) (<0.0001) (0.3137) (0.5363) 
BoardSize 0.0009  -0.0027 0.0105 c -0.0167 a  -0.0202 a  
 (0.8469) (0.1704) (0.0821) (0.0045) (0.0026) 
MktBook 0.0001  0.00001  -0.0001 0.0001  -0.0001  
 (0.6526) (0.4895) (0.4421) (0.8474) (0.4599) 
Leverage -0.0209 a -0.0040 c -0.0307 a  0.0505 a -0.0208 a 
 (0.0001) (0.0965) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0097) 
Div 0.0015 0.0010  0.0041  -0.0313 a  0.0013  
 (0.4676) (0.2757) (0.1526) (<0.0001) (0.6789) 
Idiosyncratic -0.2888 a -0.2059 a -0.0937   0.3159 b  -0.7055 a 
 (0.0050) (<0.0001) (0.4944) (0.0182) (<0.0001) 
Illiq -0.0025 0.0136 a -0.0455 a 0.0068 -0.0030 
 (0.8149) (0.0039) (0.0014) (0.6223 (0.8506) 
Recs -0.0005 a -0.0002 a -0.0005 a -0.0007 a 0.0003 b 
 (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0008) (<0.0001) (0.0572) 
Size 0.0019 b -0.0003 -0.0070 a -0.0034 a  -0.0125 a 
 (0.0267) (0.4779) (<0.0001) (0.0038) (<0.0001) 
      
      
Adj. R2 1.21% 1.94% 3.77% 10.15% 6.04% 
N 2,994 2,992 2,994 2,994 2,994 
Note: a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 2.10: Does Diversity Affect Institution-Type Ownership Differently? Excluding 
Tracking Institutions.  
Blau is a diversity index. BoardSize is the natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board. 
MktBook is a firm’s market-to-book ratio. Leverage is a firm’s debt-to-total assets ratio. Div is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the firm paid out a dividend in a given year. Idiosyncratic is a firm’s diversifiable 
risk computed using the market model. Illiq is the modified Amihud illiquidity measure. Recs is the 
average number of analyst recommendations for the firm. Size is the natural log of a firm’s total assets. Inst. 
Holdings excludes institutions that invest in every firm in the sample in a given year and institutions that 
invest in only one firm in a given year. The subscript z is an indicator for the type of institutions. Inst. 
Holdings is computed by type of institution when z is indicated. 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡. 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝑧 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑖,𝑡,𝑧 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡,𝑧 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡,𝑧 
 
 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Type 5 
      
Intercept 0.0380 a 0.0255 a 0.1506 a 0.1758 a 0.3239 a 
 (0.0002) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Blau -0.0148 b -0.0080 a -0.0390 a -0.0057  -0.0007  
 (0.0331) (0.0092) (<0.0001) (0.5281) (0.9436) 
BoardSize 0.0010  -0.0026 0.0113 c -0.0170 a  -0.0207 a  
 (0.8249) (0.1949) (0.0634) (0.0043) (0.0021) 
MktBook 0.0001 0.0001  -0.0001  0.0001  -0.0001  
 (0.6610) (0.4960) (0.4338) (0.8542) (0.4537) 
Leverage -0.0210 a  -0.0040 c -0.0308 a  0.0504 a -0.0210 a 
 (0.0001) (0.0932) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0090) 
Div 0.0014 0.0010  0.0038  -0.0314 a 0.0012  
 (0.4973) (0.2976) (0.1741) (<0.0001) (0.6994) 
Idiosyncratic -0.2890 a -0.2069 a -0.1004   0.3195 b  -0.6977 a  
 (0.0050) (<0.0001) (0.4645) (0.0171) (<0.0001) 
Illiq -0.0023 0.0137 a -0.0451 a 0.0070 -0.0028 
 (0.8297) (0.0037) (0.0015) (0.6146) (0.8589) 
Recs -0.0005 a -0.0002 a -0.0005 a -0.0007 a 0.0003 c 
 (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0008) (<0.0001) (0.0552) 
Size 0.0019 b 0.0003  -0.0070 a -0.0033 a  -0.0125 a 
 (0.0272) (0.4783) (<0.0001) (0.0036) (<0.0001) 
      
Adj. R2 1.17% 1.92% 3.74% 10.13% 6.03% 
N 2,994 2,992 2,994 2,994 2,994 
Note: a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
69 
 
Table 2.11: Robustness Test: Propensity Score Matched Sample  
Perfem is the proportion of female directors on the board. MktBook is a firm’s market-to-book ratio. 
Leverage is a firm’s debt-to-total assets ratio. Div is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm paid out a 
dividend in a given year. Abnormal Return is the geometric mean of a firm’s daily excess return above its 
expected return using the market model in the given year. Idiosyncratic is a firm’s diversifiable risk 
computed using the market model. Size is the natural log of a firm’s total assets. All Inst. Ex. Trackers 
excludes institutions that invest in every firm in the sample in a given year and institutions that invest in 
only one firm in a given year.  
 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡. 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
  Ex. Tracking Institutions 
Intercept  0.8751 a 0.8772 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Perfem  -0.1085 b - 
  (0.0375)  
Blau  - -0.0652 c 
   (0.0668) 
BoardSize  -0.0504 b -0.0501 b 
  (0.0383) (0.0432) 
MktBook  -0.0080 b -0.0081 b 
  (0.0244) (0.0228) 
Leverage  -0.0023  -0.0028  
  (0.9412) (0.9299) 
Div  -0.0137  -0.0142 
  (0.2181) (0.2057) 
Idiosyncratic  -2.8748 a  -2.8893 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Illiq  -0.0394  -0.0393 
  (0.5535) (0.5543) 
Recs  -0.0007  -0.0007  
  (0.3020) (0.3065) 
Size  -0.0283 a -0.0286 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
    
Adj. R2  9.97% 9.85% 
N  736 736 
Note: a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively 
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Table 2.12: Difference-in-Differences using Addition of Female Directors 
N is the number of matched pairs in the sample. Δ0 (Δ1) is the difference in institutional ownership for 
non-diverse (diverse) firms from time T to time T+1 where T+1 denotes the year a firm added its first 
woman to the board. Δ1 - Δ0 is the difference in the differences. The control group consists of firms that  
did not add women to the board and the treatment group consists of firms that added a woman to  the board. 
Firms in both groups were matched based on the smallest difference in firm size. Treatment is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the firm is in the treatment group; 0 otherwise. Period is an indicator variable equal to 
1 if the observation is in the post-treatment period.  
 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡. 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
 N Δ0 Δ1 Δ1 - Δ0 
     
Inst. Holdings% 60 -0.0084 -0.0417 a -0.0333 c 
Note: a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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CHAPTER 3: THE EFFECT OF GENDER DIVERSITY ON FIRM RISK IN 
EMERGING MARKETS: THE CASE OF INDIA 
3.1. Introduction  
 There is agreement amongst researchers that women tend to be more risk averse 
and less overconfident than men (Sunden & Surette, 1998; Barber & Odean, 2000). 
Another stream of literature suggests that the inclusion of women in groups leads to an 
improvement in the dynamics of the group, thus, increasing the collective performance. 
Woolley, Chabris, Pentland, Hashmi, and Malone (2010) show that the collective 
intelligence of a group is driven by the social sensitivity of the individual members and the 
proportion of female directors in the group. The differences in gender characteristics and 
changes in group dynamics suggest that the inclusion of women on a board should affect 
the firm’s risk and its profitability. Per the risk-return trade-off theory, a decrease in firm 
risk driven by gender differences in risk preferences will reduce the financial performance 
of the firm. The improvement in group dynamics contributes to better deliberations and 
higher quality decision-making. Hence, decreases in firm risk driven by improvements in 
group dynamics will increase the financial performance of the firm.  
In this essay, we investigate the effect of board gender diversity on firm risk and 
financial performance in publicly listed Indian firms. Additionally, we examine whether 
the changes in firm risk and financial performance are a result of differences in gender 
characteristics or improvements in the dynamics of the board. Prior literature explores the 
effect of gender diversity in developed markets such as the United States, Europe, 
Singapore, and Australia. This study is among the first to investigate the effect of board 
gender diversity in an emerging market. Emerging markets, such as India, are different 
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from developed markets in their economic infrastructure, cultural traditions, and legal 
environments. The differences in patriarchal traditions are expected to have an effect on 
the role women have in society. This essay highlights the effect of gender diversity and 
group dynamics in a country that is distinctly different than the countries studied in the 
literature.  
We find that board gender diversity is inversely related to firm risk and is 
proportional to financial performance. The results are robust to several measures of risk 
such as firm’s cash liquidity, stock return variability and future risk, different measures of 
financial performance such as return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA), and 
different measures of gender diversity such as the proportion of female directors on the 
board (Perfem) and the Blau diversity index, which measures diversity in a group using the 
squared proportions of each sub-group in the group. Our main results indicate that the 
addition of female directors leads to a reduction in firm risk and an improvement in 
financial performance. Together, these findings suggest that increases in the collective 
intelligence of the group, due to increasing diversity, is the main cause of the changes in 
firm risk and financial performance.  
 Han and Qui (2007) and Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) provide the theoretical and 
empirical support for the use of our primary risk variable cash holdings as a fraction of 
total assets (LIQ). The authors provide evidence that firms with higher cash holdings tend 
to have higher cash flow volatility and income uncertainty. Our univariate analysis 
indicates that firms with female directors hold 9.83% less cash than non-diverse firms. In 
our multivariate model, we find that firms with 10% female representation on the board of 
Indian firms hold 24.26% less cash with Perfem as diversity measure and 27.63% less cash 
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with Blau as diversity measures.22 We also find a negative and statistically significant 
relationship between gender diversity and stock return variability.  
 In order to identify how gender diversity affects firm risk we examine financial 
performance. In our univariate analysis we find that gender diverse firms outperform non-
diverse firms by 5.01% and 4.42% using ROE and ROA, respectively, as our measures of 
financial performance. In the multivariate analysis we find that firms with 10% female 
representation outperform non-diverse firms by 2.17% (1.98%) using ROE, depending on 
the Perfem (Blau) diversity measure. Similarly, we find that diverse firms outperform non-
diverse firms by 6.71% (8.05%) using ROA, depending on the Perfem (Blau) diversity 
measure.  
 In our study we focus on endogeneity and implement several robustness tests. First, 
our primary results are reported using Newey-West t-stat associated p-values to control for 
heterogeneity and serial correlation. Second, we test our risk and financial performance 
while controlling for industry and time fixed effects. Additionally, we use clustered 
standard errors to generate more conservative and exact t-stats. Moreover, our results are 
robust to propensity score matching using firm size, leverage, and return on assets to 
generate probability scores for the risk model and firm size and leverage to generate 
probability scores for the financial performance model.  
 Our study contributes to the literature by examining the effect of board gender 
diversity on firm risk and financial performance in India which allow us to study our 
                                                     
22 We use the estimated coefficients in Table 5 and the median value of the independent variables to 
compute the difference in cash holdings between diverse and non-diverse firms. For Perfem (Blau) we use 
0.00 and 0.10 (0.00 and 0.18) in our estimated model to compute estimated cash holdings for firms with no 
female directors and 10% female representation on the board. A Blau rating of 0.18 is equivalent to a 
Perfem of 10%.  
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hypothesis in a different social, cultural, and economic context. The study is unique in that 
it studies how gender diversity affects non-financial firms. This is important because 
studies show some evidence that the effects of gender diversity are mitigated for women 
in the financial industry. Additionally, we add to literature by providing evidence that 
improvements in group dynamics is the mechanism responsible for the risk reduction in 
firms after the addition of female directors.  
 The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature and 
presents our hypothesis. Section 3.3 describes the data. Section 3.4 reviews our 
methodology. Section 3.5 presents the results of our empirical study. Section 3.6 concludes.  
3.2. Prior Literature and Hypothesis Development  
 In this section, we review the extant literature that is most relevant to our research 
goals. In particular, we focus on studies that investigate the effect of diversity on firms’ 
financial performance and firm value. Next, we discuss empirical studies that have 
emphasized the relationship between diversity and firm risk. Lastly, we introduce literature 
on the ways gender diversity may impact firm risk and financial performance, which allows 
us to develop our research questions and emphasize our contributions to the literature.  
 Academic studies have provided evidence of a positive relationship between 
diversity and ROA and Tobin’s Q (Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003; Erhardt, Werbel, & 
Shrader, 2003). Liu, Wei, and Xie (2014) study the impact of gender diversity on the 
performance of Chinese firms. The authors find that gender diversity has a positive effect 
on return on sales and ROA. Additionally, the authors show that the effect is larger in firms 
that have more than two female directors on the board.  
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 Furthermore, there are also academic studies that do not find a significant 
relationship between diversity and financial performance and suggest that endogeneity and 
self-selection may impact the results of diversity studies. Adams and Ferreira (2009) show 
their results do not hold after controlling for endogeneity. The authors argue that gender 
quotas may unintentionally reduce firm value for well governed firms, especially if firms 
are adding less qualified and less experienced directors to the board. Matsa and Miller 
(2013) study the impact of gender quotas in Norway. The authors find that Norwegian 
firms experienced fewer workforce reductions and increasing labor costs,which led to a 
decrease in profits after the gender quota law was passed. Ahern and Dittmar (2012) 
examine the impact of Norway’s gender quota on firm value. The authors find that 
Norwegian firms lost value, as measured by Tobin’s Q, in the years following the 
announcement of the gender quota.  
 The extant literature on diversity and firm risk is sparse. Adams and Ferreira (2004) 
and Hillman, Shropshire, and Cannella (2007) find that firms with higher stock return 
variability have a lower probability of female presence on the board. The authors measure 
stock return variability in daily and monthly frequencies. They conclude that firms are less 
likely to have female directors if the firm is too complex, especially in compensation 
structure.  
 More recently, Adams and Ragunathan (2015) study gender diversity in financial 
institutions around the financial crisis of 2007-2009. The authors use weekly stock return 
volatility, idiosyncratic risk, tail risk, and Z-score as their main measures of risk. They find 
that banks with female directors did not take less risk during the crisis and performed better 
relative to non-diverse banks. They report that women who choose to have careers in 
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finance tend to be less risk averse than women in the general population and gender 
differences in risk aversion “almost disappear for men and women in finance.” Berger, 
Kick, and Schaek (2014) examine the effect of age, gender, and education of executive 
directors on risk-taking by financial institutions. The authors find that younger executive 
teams and a higher proportion of female executives increase bank risk while an increase in 
executives with Ph.D. degrees decreases risk. 
 Gender diversity may impact firm risk and financial performance in different ways. 
One way diversity may impact firm risk and financial performance is due to gender 
differences in risk preferences. Prior literature has shown that women are more risk-averse 
and less overconfident than men (Sunden & Surrette, 1998; Croson & Gneezy, 2009; 
Barber & Odean, 2000). Thus, behavioral gender differences may explain the differences 
in risk aversion between men and women. Moreover, Huang and Kisgen (2014) study the 
financing and acquisition decisions of firms with female CEOs and CFOs. The authors find 
that firms with female executives have slower growth and are less likely to acquire other 
firms. Interestingly, acquisitions made by firms with female executives have higher 
announcement day returns than firms led by male executives. The authors suggest their 
results are due to the relative overconfidence by men in corporate decision-making. 
Similarly, Levi, Li, and Zhang (2014) examine the influence of director gender in a mergers 
and acquisitions setting. The authors conclude that less overconfident female directors are 
less likely to overestimate the gains from a merger or acquisition than their male 
counterparts. Firms with more female directors are less likely to initiate a merger or 
acquisition because they may value the target firm less, due to estimating lower values of 
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future cash flows or discounting future cash flows at a higher discount rate, than their male 
counterparts as a result of less overconfidence.  
There is some evidence that gender differences in risk preferences are mitigated 
when controlling for education levels and/or financial expertise (Hibbert, Lawrence, & 
Prakash, 2013). Similarly, Hardies, Breesch, and Branson (2013) report that self-selection 
and socialization can eliminate the gender difference in overconfidence. Adams and Funk 
(2012) use a survey of directors and provide evidence that male and female directors differ 
in their risk attitudes but in ways that vary from gender differences in the general 
population. The authors conclude that female directors are more risk-loving than male 
directors, and thus, board gender diversity may not lead to more risk averse decision 
making.  
 Gender diversity may affect firms through a different mechanism. A diverse board 
may help to introduce new ideas and perspectives that a non-diverse board may lack. 
Diversity of perspective can have a positive effect on a homogenous group by introducing 
new ideas and innovations that may improve the effectiveness of a group. Prior literature 
indicates that diverse groups take longer to reach decisions, have higher quality 
deliberations, and have more effective communication than groups lacking diversity 
(Stephenson, 2004; Huse & Solberg, 2006). Furthermore, Woolley, Chabris, Pentland, 
Hashmi, and Malone (2010) provide evidence of a group intelligence factor.23 The authors 
report that the addition of females to a group increases the collective intelligence of the 
                                                     
23 Collective intelligence is shared intelligence as a result of collaboration, collective effort, and individual 
competition. It is a characteristic between people of a group and the ways in which they process 
information. Woolley et al. (2010) show that a collective intelligence factor, c, exists and is more than the 
sum of group members’ IQs.  
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group in addition to the variance of the number of speaking opportunities and individual’s 
average social sensitivity. As a result, the addition of females to a group increases the 
collective intelligence and, thus, the performance of the group.  
 Discussion in section 3.2 highlights the relationship between gender diversity and 
risk aversion. The addition of female directors to the board may alter the risk-taking 
behavior of the board as a result of gender differences in risk preferences. This may be due 
to well-defined differences in risk aversion or increasing sensitivity to changes in risk 
preferences in the decision-making process of the board. Female directors may evaluate 
future investment opportunities differently through assigning higher discount rates, 
estimating lower expected cash flows, or assigning lower probabilities of success to the 
projects in the firm’s opportunity set. If female directors are taking less risk because of 
their risk aversion, then per the risk-return tradeoff theory such firms should expect lower 
returns because they are investing their funds in safer investment vehicles. Consider the 
case in which a firm invests all of its free cash flow in a risk-free asset. The firm eliminates 
all of its risk at the expense of generating a higher rate of return for its shareholders. Hence, 
we posit that if gender differences in risk preferences affects the board, then we expect to 
see a decrease in firm risk and a decrease in financial performance.  
Furthermore, increasing diversity may lead to an improvement in the dynamics of 
the board and helps to introduce new ideas and perspectives that a non-diverse board lacks 
following our discussion. Given that boards with diversity make higher quality decisions 
and communicate more effectively, improvements in the dynamics of a diverse group may 
decrease firm risk. As a result, project selection in gender diverse firms may be superior 
relative to non-diverse firms with respect to firm risk and financial performance. If 
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improving group dynamics is the cause of a decrease in firm risk, then we posit that such 
firms will also have higher rates of return because of the increase in collective intelligence 
and the quality of deliberations. In this case, boards are willing to accept a more optimal 
level of risk, but still less risk than a non-diverse board, because the improvement in group 
dynamics will contribute to more accurate forecasts of expected cash flows, probability of 
success, and the appropriate risk-adjusted discount rate. Thus, if improvements in group 
dynamics is the underlying mechanism altering firm characteristics, then we expect a 
decrease in firm risk and an increase in financial performance.  
In summary, to determine which underlying mechanism causes changes in firm 
risk, we must also test the relationship between gender diversity and financial performance. 
We posit that both gender differences in risk preferences and improvements in group 
dynamics will lead to a decrease in firm risk. However, we posit that each factor’s effect 
on financial performance will be difference. Gender differences in risk preferences predicts 
lower financial performance while increases in collective intelligence should improve 
financial performance. As a result, we are able to determine which mechanism is 
responsible for changes in firm risk.  
First Hypothesis: Firm risk will be lower for firms with more board gender diversity.  
𝐻𝑜: 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖
1 − 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖
0 ≥ 0 
𝐻𝐴: 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖
1 − 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖
0 < 0 
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Second Hypothesis: Financial performance will be higher for firms with board gender 
diversity.  
𝐻𝑜: 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖
1 − 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖
0 ≤ 0 
𝐻𝐴: 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖
1 − 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖
0 > 0 
The superscript of 1 denotes firms with more gender diversity and 0 denotes firms with 
less gender diversity.   
3.3. Data and Sample Overview  
 The primary data source for our empirical study is the Prowess database maintained 
by the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE).24 The dataset includes 
information on more than 9,000 companies, which are listed on stock exchanges or consist 
of unlisted public limited companies having sales exceeding 200 million rupees. As a 
result, the sample is biased toward large Indian firms since Prowess does not include the 
smallest firms. This database is increasingly used to study topics affecting Indian 
industries. For example, Prowess is employed by Gopalan, Nanda, and Seru (2007) and 
Khanna and Palepu (2000) to examine the effect of foreign ownership and business group 
affiliation on the performance of Indian firms. Ghosh (2006) investigates manufacturing 
firms to examine links between financial performance and the board of directors. Gopalan 
and Gormley (2013) use Prowess to examine the importance of public equity markets in 
emerging markets.  
 In our study, we collect annual firm-level data on stock prices, group and section 
(industry) classification, and financial statement for all available Indian firms from 2005 
                                                     
24 We thank Dr. Mehul Raithatha for providing the CMIE data we use in this empirical study. 
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through 2015.25 We exclude financial and utility companies from our sample. Our sample 
includes financial data on more than 1,100 firms and 13,482 firm-year observations. Table 
3.1 reports the number of firms, the average proportion of female directors (Perfem), and 
the average Blau diversity index measure (Blau) for each year in the sample. Table 3.2 
shows the proportion of Indian firms with zero, one, and more than one female director 
from 2005 through 2015. In 2005, the majority of publicly traded Indian firms, 
approximately 78.55%, had no women on the board. By 2015, only 8.35% of sample firms 
had zero women on the board as compared to 81.04% of firms that had at least one female 
director and 10.61% of firms with two or more female directors. We present descriptive 
statistics for our sample in Table 3.3. On average, firms with female directors hold less 
cash and have higher growth potential per the market-to-book ratio. Moreover, gender 
diverse firms are more levered and invest less in current assets than non-diverse firms. 
Lastly, on average, gender diverse firms in India use their assets less efficiently than firms 
with no female directors.  
3.4. Methodology  
 In our univariate analysis of risk and financial performance we divided the sample 
into two groups, firms with zero female directors and firms with at least one female director 
to compare the differences in risk and financial performance for both groups.  
  
 
                                                     
25 All publicly traded firms in India have a fiscal year beginning in April of year t and ending in March of 
year t+1. As a result, financial data for 2016 is not available as of May 2016.  
82 
 
We test the effect of gender diversity on firm risk and control for various firm-level and 
board characteristics.  
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡+  𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑑_𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 
              +  𝛽4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 
              +  𝛽7𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
              (1) 
We use two measures of board gender diversity in our model. We compute the proportion 
of female directors on the board (Perfem) and we construct the Blau (1977) diversity 
index for each firm-year observation as follows.  
𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑢 = 1 − ∑ 𝑃𝑖
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
The Blau diversity index measures the diversity of a group by summing the squares of the 
proportion of each subgroup (male and female) in the group (board of directors). Following 
our hypothesis, we expect gender diversity to be negatively related to our measures of firm 
risk given that females tend to be more risk-averse than men and that the addition of women 
to a group increases the collective intelligence of the group. If all directors have the same 
gender, then the Blau diversity index of the group is 0. The maximum Blau diversity index 
of a group depends on the number of subgroups in the group. As the number of subgroups 
approaches an infinitely large number, the Blau diversity index approaches 1. In our study, 
we have two subgroups (male and female) and, thus, n = 2 in the Blau equation, which 
implies a maximum Blau diversity index of 0.50.  
 Prior literature associates a number of factors that affect cash holdings (LIQ), our 
proxy of firm risk. Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) examine U.S. cash holdings and find that 
the large rise in cash holdings is a result of a precautionary demand for cash as a result of 
firms’ cash flows becoming riskier over time. Like Bates et al. (2009) we control for 
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market-to-book (Mktbook), firm size (Firm size), cash flow (Cashflow), capital 
expenditures (Capex), leverage (Lev), and research and development expenses (R&D). In 
addition, we include two corporate governance controls that are related to firm risk: the 
size of the board of directors (BoardSize) and the proportion of outside directors 
(OutDirectors).  
 Mktbook is a proxy for investment opportunities. If a firm has a high Mktbook 
value, then it typically has a strong investment opportunity set. Firms with stronger 
investment opportunities are safer and less risky because such firms are likely to produce 
competitive returns on investment. Thus, we expect a negative relationship between 
Mktbook and cash holdings, our proxy for risk. Firm size is computed as the logarithm of 
the book value of total assets. Larger firms tend to hold less cash per the transaction motive, 
which states that firms hold cash to meet their daily disbursement activities. Larger firms 
benefit from economies of scale, and thus, the transaction motive argues that larger firms 
hold less cash.  
Cashflow is computed as earnings after taxes, interest, and dividends but before 
depreciation. Firms with higher levels of Cashflow can accumulate more cash at a faster 
pace. Thus, we expect firms that generate high levels of Cashflow to be less risky. 
However, firms that do not invest their accumulated cash holdings tend to be more risky 
as a lack of investments may be due to the firm having no growth potential.   
 Capex is used to purchase productive assets that can be held as collateral or lead to 
increases in productivity. As such, a lack of investment opportunities may cause little 
investment in productive assets, which limits the firm’s ability to expand production and 
growth. Thus, we expect that firms with higher capital expenditures will have less cash 
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holdings and be less risky. Lev is total debt divided by total assets. If the firm has a high 
level of debt, then we expect the firm to be more risky. However, at the same time, firms 
that have the ability (and financial stability) to accumulate higher levels of debt tend to be 
less risky. As a result, we have no ex-ante expectations on the relationship between 
leverage and risk. Additionally, R&D, like Mktbook can serve as a proxy for future 
investment opportunities because they are expenditures a firm makes to expand its growth 
potential. Thus, firms that spend more on R&D will have less cash and less risk.  
 Wang (2012) studies the relationship between board size and firm risk-taking. The 
author finds that smaller boards are associated with higher future risk, which supports the 
notion that board size is inversely related to firm risk-taking. We include BoardSize in our 
model to control for the corporate governance of the firm. We expect larger boards to be 
less risky and hold less cash. Lastly, academic studies have reported links between director 
independence and firm risk. Many studies suggest that a higher proportion of independent 
directors is associated with less firm risk (Ni & Purda, 2012). Thus, we expect a negative 
relationship between OutDirectors and firm risk.  
 We perform a univariate analysis by comparing the mean difference in financial 
performance, measures as ROE and ROA, between diverse and non-diverse firms. 
Additionally, we study the relationship between return on equity and diversity with the 
following regression specification.  
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 
                     𝛽3𝐸𝑞𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑇𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 
                                     𝛽6𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(2) 
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Boyd, Boland, Dhuyvetter, and Barton (2007) study the determinants of financial 
performance and find that liquidity, leverage, profitability, and efficiency variables help 
explain ROE. Firms with low current ratios may have short-term issues financing their 
obligations. However, firms with high current ratios, although they have sufficient 
liquidity, may be underinvesting in productive assets, which may harm financial 
performance and growth. Hence, we have no ex-ante expectations on the relationship 
between CurrentRatio and financial performance. Additionally, firms that use more debt in 
their capital structure will have higher EqMulti ratios. Increasing debt may lower financial 
performance if more revenue is needed to service the debt and if the assets financed with 
the debt do not produce revenue as intended. Conversely, if the debt-finance productive 
assets perform well, then increased debt may improve the financial performance of the 
firm. As a result, we have no ex-ante expectations for the relationship between EqMulti 
and financial performance.  
 Next, we control for net profit margin as higher net income leads to higher ROE 
and return on sales. Thus, we expect a positive relationship between NetProfit and financial 
performance. Asset turnover controls for the efficiency of the firm. A higher asset turnover 
indicates a firm is producing more revenue for each dollar in assets it operates with. Thus, 
we expect more efficient firms to have higher financial performance. Firms with stronger 
financial performance are better able to service their debt. We expect firms with higher 
interest coverage ratios to have better financial performance. We also control for 
economies of scale by including firm size in our model. Larger firms may benefit from the 
cost savings associated with producing at a larger scale than smaller firms, which increases 
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net income. As a result, we expect firm size to be positively relative to financial 
performance.  
 To help address selection bias and endogeneity, we employ a propensity-score 
matched sample framework. Following Levi, Li, and Zhang (2014), we generate our 
probability scores through yearly logit regressions. Our dependent variable is a binary 
variable indicating the presence of female directors on the board, and the explanatory 
variables are firm size, leverage, and ROA for the risk model and solely the former two 
variables for the financial performance model.  
 Lastly, we run additional tests for the firm risk and financial performance models. 
The primary empirical setting reports Newey-West t-stat associated p-values, which 
control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. Additionally, in other regression 
variations we control for industry and time fixed effects as well as clustered standard errors, 
which control for unobservable factors we may have excluded in the model. Furthermore, 
we use alternative measures of risk including stock return variability and two measures of 
future risk, stock return variability for the next 12 and 24 months following Wang (2012).  
3.5. Empirical Results  
 In Table 3.4 we present the results of our univariate analysis in which we compare 
the differences in risk and financial performance for diverse and non-diverse firms. Our 
proxy of risk, LIQ, is significantly lower for gender diverse firms as diverse firms tend to 
hold 9.83% less cash than non-diverse firms.26 There is statistical difference in financial 
                                                     
26 We compute the percentage difference between the means as the ratio of the absolute difference between 
the two means and their average.  
 
%𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 =
|𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒|
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑤𝑜 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑠
∗ 100 
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performance between diverse and non-diverse firms although ROA is higher for firms with 
female directors.  
 In Table 3.5 we present the empirical results from our model in equation 1. We run 
different variations of the model to increase sample size and statistical power. Perfem is 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level for both variations of the model. 
Additionally, Blau is negative and statistically significant for both regressions. The 
estimated coefficients for Capex and R&D are consistently negative, which is consistent 
with the idea that firms that invest more in R&D and Capex are less risky. Similarly, 
BoardSize and OutDirectors are negative, highlighting the notion that larger boards and 
more independent directors lower firm risk. In Table 3.6 we report the results of the 
financial performance model. The coefficients of Perfem and Blau are positive but not 
significant when measuring financial performance using ROE. However, the coefficients 
for both our diversity measures are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level 
using ROA as the measure of financial performance. Consistent with our ex-ante 
expectations, profitability, efficiency, solvency, and firm size are positively and 
significantly related to financial performance in both our models. Although we had no ex-
ante expectations for CurrentRatio and EqMulti, we find that short-term liquidity positively 
affects financial performance and leverage positively affects ROA. Overall, we find that 
firms with more board gender diversity tend to be less risky and perform better than firms 
with no female directors on the board.  
 In Table 3.7 we report the results of the risk model, controlling for time and industry 
fixed effects and clustered standard errors. In the fixed model, we find both diversity 
measures are negative and significant at the 5% level. Moreover, we report clustered 
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standard errors, in which we cluster by industry, and report that both diversity measures 
are negative and significant at the 1% level. Interestingly, only Capex and OutDirectors are 
negative and significant in both models, which is consistent with the idea that higher 
investments by the firm and more independent directors contribute to decreasing firm risk. 
Similarly, in Table 3.8 we report the financial performance regression results controlling 
for time and fixed effects. We report that gender diversity is positively and significantly 
related to financial performance at the 1% level. Also, we find that profitability, efficiency, 
firm size, leverage, and interest coverage are positively and significantly related to 
financial performance for ROE and ROA.  
 In Table 3.9 we report the results of the propensity score matched sample using 
variations of the risk model. In each regression, gender diversity is inversely related to firm 
risk. In addition, we find evidence indicating that boards with more independent directors 
are less risky. Consistent with prior findings, we find Capex to be negatively associated 
with firm risk. The coefficients on FirmSize and Mktbook are positively related to firm 
risk, which is inconsistent with our prediction. However, risk does not appear to be 
sensitive to changes in firm size and growth opportunities. In Table 3.10 we report the 
financial performance regression results for the propensity score matched sample. We find 
that both diversity measures are positively and significantly related to the financial 
performance of the firm. Similar to prior findings, profitability, efficiency, firm size, and 
liquidity positively affect financial performance.  
 In Table 3.11 we report the results of the risk model using our alternative measures 
of risk and using clustered standard errors. We find that Perfem and Blau are negatively 
and significantly related to the stock return variability of Indian firms. That is to say that 
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firms with female directors tend to have less stock return variability. However, our two 
measures of future risk are negative but not significant in our model. Unlike our other 
findings, Mktbook and FirmSize are inversely related to our alternative measures of risk, 
indicating that larger firms with more growth potential are less risky.  
3.6. Conclusion 
 In this essay we examine the relationship between board gender diversity and firm 
risk and financial performance in publicly listed Indian firms. Previous literature suggests 
that board gender diversity may impact risk and financial performance. The addition of 
female directors may decrease risk due to gender differences in risk preferences, i.e. 
women are more risk averse than men or due to an increase in the collective intelligence of 
the board. Moreover, lower risk taking due to higher risk aversion will result in lower 
returns for the firm while increases in the collective intelligence of the group will improve 
decision-making and forecasts of future project cash flows. We report that board gender 
diversity is inversely related to firm risk using various measures of risk, such as stock return 
variability and future stock variability, and positively related to the financial performance 
of the board, as measured by ROE and ROA. Thus, we provide evidence that changes in 
the risk and financial performance of the firm are due to the improvement in the dynamics 
and collective intelligence of boards with gender diversity.  
 Our results are robust to several endogeneity tests and alternative measures of risk 
and financial performance. Additionally, we test our risk and financial performance model 
using a propensity score matched sample, controlling for time and industry fixed effects, 
using clustered standard errors, and Newey-West t-stat associated p-values. Overall, we 
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provide evidence that the addition of female directors decreases firm risk and improves 
financial performance.  
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Table 3.1. Board Gender Diversity of NSE-Listed Firms  
This table reports the measures of board diversity over time. N is the number of firms.  
Perfem is the average percent of female directors on the board of NSE-listed companies. 
Blau reports the average Blau index rating of NSE-listed firms for each year in the sample.  
The Blau rating ranges from 0, representing no diversity, to 0.50, maximum diversity. 
 
Year N PerFem Blau 
2005 1,114 3.01% 0.0490 
2006 1,170 3.22% 0.0514 
2007 1,201 3.47% 0.0569 
2008 1,215 3.51% 0.0598 
2009 1,234 3.46% 0.0588 
2010 1,253 3.71% 0.0620 
2011 1,269 3.65% 0.0625 
2012 1,281 3.82% 0.0653 
2013 1,279 3.98% 0.0679 
2014 1,269 4.29% 0.0735 
2015 1,197 10.56% 0.1837 
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Table 3.2. Proportion of Indian Firms Grouped By Number of Female Directors  
This table reports proportion of sample firms with 0, 1, and more than 1 female director on the board. 0, 
1, and >1 represent the proportion of firms with zero, one, and more than one female director. N is the 
number of sample firms.  
 
 
 # Female Directors 
Year N 0 1 >1 Total 
2005 1,114 78.55% 17.86% 3.59% 100.00% 
2006 1,170 75.81% 19.40% 4.79% 100.00% 
2007 1,201 73.11% 21.15% 5.75% 100.00% 
2008 1,215 71.77% 21.98% 6.26% 100.00% 
2009 1,234 72.12% 21.47% 6.40% 100.00% 
2010 1,253 70.15% 23.38% 6.46% 100.00% 
2011 1,269 69.42% 24.43% 6.15% 100.00% 
2012 1,281 68.15% 25.21% 6.64% 100.00% 
2013 1,279 67.24% 25.57% 7.19% 100.00% 
2014 1,269 64.38% 28.21% 7.41% 100.00% 
2015 1,197 8.35% 81.04% 10.61% 100.00% 
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Table 3.3. Descriptive Statistics, 2005-2015 
The descriptive statistics of the sample are presented in two groups: firms with no gender diversity (Female = 0) 
and firms with gender diversity (Female = 1). N is the number for firm-year observations. Mean is the average of  
the firm-year observations. Med is the median observation. Std Dev is the standard deviation of firm-year 
observations for each variable. Min and Max are the minimum and maximum value of the variable. Variable 
definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
 
 
 
 
Female = 0 
  
Female =1 
 N Mean Med St Dev Min Max 
 
N Mean Med St Dev Min Max 
Dependent Variables       
 
      
Liq 8,789 0.07 0.03 0.10 0.001 0.60 
 
4,668 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.001 0.60 
ROE 8,744 0.11 0.12 0.28 -1.35 1.17 
 
4,665 0.11 0.11 0.26 -1.35 1.17 
ROA 8,100 0.04 0.04 0.08 -0.28 0.27 
 
4,338 0.04 0.04 0.07 -0.28 0.27 
Independent Variables       
 
      
Mktbook 6,947 1.55 0.89 2.18 -0.92 14.60 
 
4,129 1.97 1.03 2.67 -0.92 14.60 
Firm_Size 8,812 22.19 22.18 1.87 11.51 28.93 
 
4,670 22.66 22.54 1.77 12.61 29.01 
CashFlow 5,369 0.09 0.08 0.08 -1.96 0.90 
 
3,087 0.09 0.08 0.07 -1.29 0.76 
Lev 8,812 0.61 0.59 0.82 0 66 
 
4,670 0.57 0.56 0.58 0 32.82 
R&D 3,224 0.01 0.003 0.039 0 1 
 
1,896 0.01 0.003 0.05 0 1.20 
Capex 8,536 0.32 0.26 0.47 0 33.31 
 
4,587 0.30 0.25 0.28 0.002 6.11 
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Table 3.3 (Continued). Descriptive Statistics, 2005-2015 
 
  Female = 0  Female =1 
 N Mean Med St Dev Min Max  N Mean Med St Dev Min Max 
CurrentRatio 8,737 2.76 1.68 3.88 0.08 37.17  4,663 2.57 1.45 4.04 0.08 37.17 
EqMulti 8,097 2.07 1.59 1.68 0.60 14.99  4,338 2.19 1.63 1.90 0.60 14.99 
NetProfit 4,621 0.08 0.05 1.05 -2.98 24.47  4,621 0.06 0.05 0.91 -2.98 24.47 
AssetTO 8,034 0.93 0.82 0.62 0.001 3.22  4,314 0.85 0.72 0.61 0.001 3.22 
TIE 8,246 44.43 2.82 193.86 -26.48 1538  4,456 54.06 2.93 220.47 -26.48 1538 
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Table 3.4. Univariate Analysis of Risk and Performance Measures 
The univariate statistics of the sample are presented in two groups: firms with no gender diversity (Female = 0) and 
firms with gender diversity (Female = 1). N is the number of firm-year observations. Mean is the sample average 
of the variable of interest. Std Dev is the standard deviation.  Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.  
 
 
  Female = 0  Female = 1  Difference in Means 
           
Var N Mean Std Dev  N Mean Std Dev  Difference P-value 
                 
Liq 8,789 0.0651 0.10  4,668 0.059 0.09  -0.0061a 0.0003 
                
ROE 8,744 0.1117 0.28  4,665 0.1061 0.26  -0.0056  0.2580 
                
ROA 8,100 0.0411 0.08  4,338 0.0430 0.07  0.0019  0.1639 
Note: a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 3.5. Does Gender Diversity Affect Firm Risk?   
This table reports the results from our model of firm risk (LIQ) using Perfem and Blau as alternative 
measures of diversity. The first and third column report the results using a limited version of the model 
while the second and fourth column report he results using the full model. The p-values reported in 
parentheses are the Newey-West t-stat associated p-values. Variable definitions are provided in 
Appendix A.  
 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
  LIQ 
Intercept  0.0190  0.0705 c 0.0183 0.0694 c 
  (0.5023) (0.0698) (0.5202) (0.0740) 
Perfem  -0.0536 a -0.0959 a --- --- 
  (0.0073) (0.0009)   
Blau  --- --- -0.0314 b -0.0585 a 
    (0.0108) (0.0007) 
Board_Size  -0.0146  0.0115  -0.0144 0.0118 
  (0.1022) (0.2299) (0.1067) (0.2162) 
OutDirectors  -0.0461 a  -0.0696 a  -0.0460 a -0.0695 a 
  (0.0002) (<0.0001) (0.0002) (<0.0001) 
Firm_Size  0.0051 a 0.0030 c 0.0051 a 0.0030 c 
  (0.0010) (0.0604) (0.0010) (0.0584) 
Mktbook  0.0053 a 0.0055 a 0.0053 a 0.0055 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
CashFlow  0.0576 b 0.0264   0.0576 b 0.0261 
  (0.0197) (0.3976) (0.0197) (0.4034) 
Lev  -0.0614 a -0.1168 a -0.0614 a -0.1168 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Capex  --- -0.0655 a --- -0.0657 a 
   (<0.0001)  (<0.0001) 
R&D*(1,000,000)  ---  -1.72  --- -1.73 
   (0.2493)  (0.2466) 
      
Adj. R2  6.79% 13.95% 6.78% 13.98% 
N   6,911 3,484 6,911 3,484 
Note: a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 3.6. Do Indian Firms Perform Better With More Diversity on the Board?  
This table reports the results from our model of performance (Return on Equity and Return on Assets) 
using Perfem and Blau as alternative measures of diversity. The p-values reported in parentheses are the 
Newey-West t-stat associated p-values. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
  Return on Equity Return on Assets 
Intercept  -0.0971 a -0.0966 a -0.1234 a -0.1230 a 
  (0.0161) (0.0164) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Perfem  0.0193  --- 0.0210 b --- 
  (0.5661)  (0.0160)  
Blau  --- 0.0112 --- 0.0144 b 
   (0.6250)  (0.0147) 
CurrentRatio  0.0027 a 0.0027 a 0.0018 a 0.0018 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
EqMulti  -0.0007 a -0.0007  0.0073 a 0.0073 a 
  (0.6535) (0.6545) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
NetProfit  0.0272 a 0.2718 a 0.0185 a 0.0185 a 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Asset TO  0.0856 a 0.0856 a 0.0406 a 0.0406 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
TIE  0.0002 a 0.0002 b 0.0001 a 0.0001 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Size  0.0050 a 0.0050 a 0.0047 a 0.0047 a 
  (0.0021) (0.0021) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
      
      
ADJ. R2  5.54% 5.54% 24.45% 24.45% 
N  10,949 10,949 10,949 10,949 
Note: a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 3.7. Robustness: Industry and Time Fixed Effects and Industry-Level Clustering   
This table reports the results from our model of firm risk (LIQ) using Perfem and Blau as alternative 
measures of diversity. The p-values reported in parentheses are the Newey-West t-stat associated p-
values. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.  
 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
  Fixed Effects Clustered Standard Errors 
Intercept    0.0705 0.0694  
    (0.3974) (0.4037) 
Perfem  -0.0567 b --- -0.0959 a --- 
  (0.0142)  (0.0004)  
Blau  --- -0.0346 b --- -0.0585 a 
   (0.0122)  (0.0003) 
Board_Size  0.0070  0.0072  0.0115 0.0118 
  (0.2000) (0.1867) (0.5235) (0.5111) 
OutDirectors  -0.0675 a  -0.0675 a  -0.0696 b -0.0694 b 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0143) (0.0143) 
Firm_Size  0.0014  0.0014  0.0030  0.0030  
  (0.2085) (0.2061) (0.2322) (0.2285) 
Mktbook  0.0065 a 0.0065 a 0.0055 a 0.0055 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
CashFlow  -0.0130  -0.0130   0.0264  0.0261 
  (0.5542) (0.5539) (0.2916) (0.2961) 
Lev  -0.1174 a -0.1183 a -0.1168 a -0.1168 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Capex  -0.0611 a -0.0612 a -0.0655 a -0.0657 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0021) (0021) 
R&D*(1,000,000)  0.9341  -0.9406  -1.70 -1.70 
  (0.4015) (0.3983) (0.3432) (0.3411) 
      
Industry FE  Yes Yes No No 
Time FE  Yes Yes No No 
      
R2  18.57% 18.58% 14.17% 13.98% 
N   3,484 3,484 3,484 3,484 
Note: a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 3.8. Robustness: Performance Fixed Effects 
This table reports the results from our model of performance (Return on Equity and Return on Assets) 
using Perfem and Blau as alternative measures of diversity. The p-values reported in parentheses are the 
Newey-West t-stat associated p-values. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
  Return on Equity Return on Assets 
Perfem  0.1052 a  --- 0.0530 a --- 
  (0.0059)  (<0.0001)  
Blau  --- 0.0779 a --- 0.0398 a 
   (0.0016)  (<0.0001) 
CurrentRatio  -0.0006  -0.0006  0.0007 a 0.0007 a 
  (0.5136) (0.5081) (0.0009) (0.0010) 
EqMulti  0.0032 c 0.0032 c  0.0087 a 0.0087 a 
  (0.0850) (0.0855) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
NetProfit  0.0241 a 0.0241 a 0.0174 a 0.0174 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Asset TO  0.0806 a 0.0806 a 0.0401 a 0.0401 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
TIE  0.0002 a 0.0002 b 0.0001 a 0.0001 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Size  0.0099 a 0.0098 a 0.0062 a 0.0062 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
      
Industry F.E.  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
ADJ. R2  9.60% 9.62% 30.35% 30.42% 
N  10,949 10,949 10,949 10,949 
Note: a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 3.9. Propensity Score Matched Sample: Firm Liquidity  
This table reports the results from our model of firm risk (LIQ) using Perfem and Blau as alternative 
measures of diversity. The p-values reported in parentheses are the Newey-West t-stat associated p-
values. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.  
 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
  LIQ 
Intercept  0.0411 b  0.0952 a 0.0399 c 0.0941 a 
  (0.0509) (0.0023) (0.0577) (0.0026) 
Perfem  -0.0512 a -0.0826 a --- --- 
  (0.0053) (0.0033)   
Blau  --- --- -0.0292 a -0.0512 a 
    (0.0093) (0.0023) 
Board_Size  -0.0087 c  0.0069  -0.0084 c 0.0073 
  (0.0761) (0.3510) (0.0870) (0.3259) 
OutDirectors  -0.0515 a  -0.0855 a  -0.0513 a -0.0855 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Firm_Size  0.0047 a 0.0029 b 0.0047 a 0.0030 b 
  (<0.0001) (0.0372) (<0.0001) (0.0361) 
Mktbook  0.0057 a 0.0060 a 0.0057 a 0.0060 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
CashFlow  0.0001  -0.0487 a   0.0003  -0.0484 a 
  (0.9958) (0.0060) (0.9828) (0.0062) 
Lev  -0.0934 a -0.1322 a -0.0933 a -0.1319 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Capex  --- -0.0244 a --- -0.00244 a 
   (0.0094)  (0.0095) 
R&D*(1,000,000)  ---  -0.7620  --- -0.0769 
   (0.6795)  (0.6766) 
      
Adj. R2  10.01% 14.78% 9.99% 14.81% 
N   3,937 2,027 3,937 2,027 
Note: a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 3.10. Propensity Score Matched Sample: Financial Performance   
This table reports the results from our model of performance (Return on Equity and Return on Assets) 
using Perfem and Blau as alternative measures of diversity. The p-values reported in parentheses are the 
Newey-West t-stat associated p-values. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
  Return on Equity Return on Assets 
Intercept  -0.1810 a -0.1796 a -0.1216 a -0.1214 a 
  (0.0005) (0.0005) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Perfem  0.1140 a --- 0.0462 a --- 
  (0.0088)  (<0.0001)  
Blau  --- 0.0810 a --- 0.0344 a 
   (0.0051)  (<0.0001) 
CurrentRatio  0.0023 b 0.0023 b 0.0015 a 0.0015 a 
  (0.0331) (0.0318) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
EqMulti  0.0002 0.0001 0.0063 a 0.0063 a 
  (0.9406) (0.9551) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
NetProfit  0.0235 a 0.0235 a 0.0143 a 0.0143 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Asset TO  0.0873 a 0.0874 a 0.0399 a 0.0340 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
TIE  0.0002 a 0.0002 b 0.0001 a 0.0001 a 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Size  0.0085 a 0.0084 a 0.0048 a 0.0048 a 
  (<0.0001) (0.0021) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
      
      
ADJ. R2  5.91% 5.93% 22.84% 22.90% 
N  5,495 5,495 5,495 5,495 
Note: a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 3.11. Regression Analysis with Alternative Risk Measures 
This table reports the panel regression of total stock return variability, using the previous 5 years of 
monthly stock returns for each firm, on the fraction of female directors (Perfem) and control variables.  
Additionally, the table reports the results from the regression using future stock return volatility over the 
next 12 months, and future stock return volatility over the next 24 months. We report p-values associated 
with the industry clustered standard errors. P-values are in parentheses. Variable definitions are provided 
in Appendix A.  
 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
 Total Risk SD12 SD24 
Intercept 0.2845 a 0.2842 a 0.2698 a 0.2697 a 0.2907 a 0.2907 a 
 (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Perfem -0.0258 b --- -0.0053 --- -0.0038 --- 
 (0.0451)  (0.5457)  (0.6522)  
Blau --- -0.0165 b --- -0.0034 --- -0.0026 
  (0.0382)  (0.5417)  (0.6243) 
Board_Size 0.0003  0.0004 -0.0066 a  -0.0066 a -0.0041 -0.0040 
 (0.9113) (0.8821) (0.0033) (0.0031) (0.1581) (0.1558) 
OutDirectors 0.0075  0.0076  -0.0083  -0.0083 -0.0048 -0.0048 
 (0.2209) (0.2165) (0.2212) (0.2230) (0.3877) (0.3900) 
Firm_Size -0.0073 a -0.0073 a  -0.0064 a -0.0064 a -0.0075 a -0.0075 a 
 (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Mktbook -0.0039 a  -0.0039 a -0.0045 a  -0.0045 a -0.0041 a -0.0041 a 
 (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
CashFlow 0.0266 b 0.0265 b -0.0311 a -0.0311 a -0.0334 a -0.0034 a 
 (0.0176) (0.0178) (0.0068) (0.0069) (0.0026) (0.0026) 
Lev 0.0831 a  0.0831   0.0800 a  0.0801 a 0.0849 a 0.0849 a 
 (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Capex -0.0204 c -0.0205 c -0.0061 -0.0061 -0.0085 -0.0085 
 (0.0991) (0.0985) (0.5193) (0.5190) (0.4206) (0.4203) 
R&D*(1,000,000) -2.1000 a -2.1000 a -0.5000 -0.5000 -0.3000 -0.3000 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.2036) (0.2037) (0.4135) (0.4131) 
       
R2 18.99% 19.00% 14.87% 14.88% 19.17% 19.18% 
N  3,474 3,474 3,484 3,484 3,484 3,484 
Note: a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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APPENDIX  
 
APPENDIX A  
 
ANALYTICAL AND GRAPHICAL ANALYSIS OF DIVERSITY FUNCTIONS  
 
Define f ≡ proportion of female directors and m ≡ proportion of male directors. Then, 
our diversity measures can be written as functions of f.   
 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑚(𝑓) = 𝑓 
 
(1) 
𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑢(𝑓) = 1 − ∑ 𝑝𝑖
2 = 1 − (𝑓2 + 𝑚2)
2
𝑖=1
 (2) 
  
We can rewrite equation (2) solely as a function of f by substituting 1-f for m (because f + 
m=1). This results in equation (4).  
𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑢(𝑓) = −2𝑓2 + 2𝑓 (4) 
 
Advantages of Blau Over Perfem 
Perfem is a linear objective function, and thus, its extrema occur at corner solutions (0% 
or 100% females). Blau is a quadratic objective function that can be maximized when we 
take the derivative with respect to f and solve for the critical point in which diversity is 
maximized. Setting the first derivative equal to zero, we find that Blau is maximized when 
f=0.50 or 50%. The second derivative with respect to f confirms that 0.50 is a maximum 
point.  
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In Figure 1, we plot the two diversity functions, Perfem and Blau. As mentioned earlier, 
we can see that Blau is maximized when the proportion of female directors is exactly 50%. 
The analysis reveals two important benefits of using Blau over Perfem: 
1) Perfem fails to parsimoniously measure diversity when f is greater than 0.50. Perfem 
incorrectly translates an all-female board as perfect diversity.  
2) Since Perfem is a linear function, the proportion of female directors has a constant, 
positive marginal effect on diversity, i.e. going from 0% to 10% has the same marginal 
effect as going from 10% to 20% and so on. However, this is not the case with Blau as the 
marginal effect on diversity is higher when going from 0% to 10% than when going from 
10% to 20% and so on until 50% is reached when, unlike Perfem, the Blau index begins to 
have a negative marginal effect to correctly measure the fact that 100% females is 0 
diversity.  
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Figure 2 highlights the second benefit of using the Blau index by comparing the slopes of 
the diversity functions across different levels of f.  It is clear that Perfem has the same 
positive effect on diversity and is incorrectly increasing its diversity function as f 
approaches 1 (100%). Additionally, it is clear that Blau more strongly affects diversity than 
Perfem when going from 0% to 10% and, eventually, begins to have a negative effect on 
diversity (when f = 0.50 or slope = 0). This is beneficial as the effect of adding the first 
and second woman will impact the firm more strongly than adding a fourth or fifth woman 
to the board.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.1000
-0.0500
0.0000
0.0500
0.1000
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
M
ar
gi
n
al
 D
iv
er
si
ty
f, proportion of female directors
Marginal Effect of Proportion of Female 
Directors
dBlau dPerfem
112 
 
VITA 
 
JODONNIS RODRIGUEZ 
 
    Born, Miami, Florida 
 
2005-2009    B.A., Business Administration 
University of Florida  
Gainesville, Florida  
 
2009-2010    M.A., International Business  
University of Florida 
Gainesville, Florida  
 
2011-2012    M.S., Finance 
    Florida International University 
    Miami, Florida  
 
2012-2016    Doctoral Candidate 
Florida International University 
Miami, Florida  
 
 
WORKING PAPERS AND PRESENTATIONS 
 
Lawrence, E.R., Dandapani, K., Rodriguez, J. Determinants of Online Banking. Journal 
of Financial Services Research (Revise and Resubmit, Journal of Financial Services 
Research).  
 
Rodriguez, J., Hamid, S. (2014). Cash Reserves, Risk, and Financial Distress: An Asset 
Pricing Perspective. Paper presented at the Global Finance Association 2014 Annual 
Meeting, Dubai, UAE.  
 
Lawrence, E., Dandapani, K., Rodriguez, J. (2014). Determinants of Online Banking. 
Paper presented at the World Finance & Banking Symposium 2014 Annual Meeting, 
Singapore, Singapore.  
 
Lawrence, E., Dandapani, K., Rodriguez, J. (2015). Determinants of Online Banking. 
Paper presented at the Southwestern Finance Association 2015 Annual Meeting, 
Houston, Texas.  
 
Rodriguez, J., Lawrence, E. (2015). The Impact of Board Gender Diversity on Firms’ 
Risk and Financial Performance. Paper presented at The Academy of Behavioral Finance 
& Economics 2015 Annual Meeting, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  
 
113 
 
Rodriguez, J., Lawrence, E. (2015). The Impact of Board Gender Diversity on Firms’ 
Risk and Financial Performance. Paper presented at the Southern Finance Association 
2015 Annual Meeting, Captiva Island, Florida.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
